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RE: PIX Question
From: jamesworld () intelligencia com
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 10:22:57 -0600

Stephen, et al,

I agree whole heartedly with 2827 filtering and the PIX can do that as well (router can too). I however, disagree with 1918 at the edge router. The ASA algorithm in the PIX makes it a better location to handle the NATing of public to 1918 addresses. Also, the edge router is not being burdened. It's doing a routers job: routing. Let the security device take care of security.

I was not giving a definitive plan for deployment. Just making answers to specific comments/questions.

Still, lock up the router, use access-classes on the VTY lines. Disable unused transports, verify the IOS against field notices. Use the local database or better yet, a TACACS+ server to authenticate and log attempts to break in to the router. (since you have it use it on the PIX and the rest of your network infrastructure). Check your logs daily. Disable SNMP and every service that is not needed on the external edge routers. (internal too :)

Just like your own body, treat your network the same way. look after it daily, protect it against the elements that come against it and keep the juice clean :-)


At 08:33 11/18/02, Stephen Wilcox wrote:

I would still practice RFC1918 and RFC2827 at your edge router

Stephen Wilcox
R & D Specialists
Universal Computer Systems
Voice: (713) 718-1800 ext. 2172
Email: Stephenwilcox () universalcomputersys com

-----Original Message-----
From: jamesworld () intelligencia com [mailto:jamesworld () intelligencia com]
Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 7:24 AM
To: naman.latif () inamed com
Cc: security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: PIX Question

You need no protection.  The PIX will withstand what is put against it.
All the advice you are receiving about BDS fw, IOS FW and the like doesn't
address your specific need.

Key being.  You are terminating IPSEC.  You put another FW in front and you
risk losing the IPSEC.

I work with PIX daily.  It needs no protection.
As far at telnet (you cannot telnet to the outside of a PIX- impossible)
Set up access via the command: http <host_IP_address>
for each host you want to have access from.
Better yet, open none of that and VPN to the PIX and then use
telnet/ssh/pdm from inside the VPN tunnel.

Don't run CBAC unless you have a 3600 series router or above.

If you really want protection that the PIX does not provide, get your ISP
to limit the ICMP traffic to a max of 20 % of incoming traffic. help
protect against DDOS

Got questions, email me offline

>Sent: Monday, November 04, 2002 8:47 PM
>To: security-basics () security-focus com
>Subject: Protecting PIX Firewall at the Perimeter Router
>Hi All,
>I wanted some suggestions\practical experiences for protecting a
>Firewall wall at the Perimeter Router Level.
>We have a PIX Firewall connected to our Cisco Router, which is
>connected to the Internet. Should there be any IOS Firewall Rules in
>the Router, other than blocking Telnet,FTP etc to the Firewall itself
>PIX will be doing NAT, protecting DMZ machines, and IPSec
>Regards \\ Naman

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