mailing list archives
Re: Securing workstations from IT guys - topic orginator
From: "WALI" <hkhasgiwale () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2007 11:05:30 +0400
Thank for the replies guys and I am amazed at the responses I recieved.
Would like especially thank the following guys and their sustantive
suggestion, this in no way implies that other's well less substantive but
it's just that I would highlight those that might work in my scenario.
* marc owen - for his suggestion of secure admin delegation model
* Cory capps - for his/her suggestion of deploying a DC with EFS keys. I
was wondering if deployment of a Windows 2003 DC with IPSEC security be any
* Tremain Lea - for suggesting username99 option.
* Krymson for highlighting some simple areas that might have been
* Kurt Buff - for sugesting deployment of SNARE. I feel it might be helpful
and make a great central logging place.
* Kurt Kesslar - for suggesting the deployment of absolute minimal rights
for IT Staff. Would get back to him for more insights into such design.
* Bert Knabe - again for his suggestion of deploying and monitor shortname
accounts and company wide deployed solution, but would love to know
* Scott - for bringing into fore the possibility of one of our Exchange
admins, who might be abusing email servers.
* Craig Wright's - AGULP Model
* Big Joe Jenkins - The idea of each of our IT admin sign on an AUP and NDA
is a valid suggestion and I have already initiated that.
* Micheal Martinez - suggests that we design and formulate a document for
There was one more thing which I thought someone would throw some more light
1. Disabling default C$/D$/Admin$ shares upon startup on all HR workstations
that join the domain. Would this have any adverse effect on the way the HR
2. Creating a separate domain for HR employees and establishing an
administrative boundry, assigning only 1-2 well trusted network admins,
rights on this domain?
It' s a bit hard to find the erring network admin and bring him to book at
this point in time, but all I can (as an IT security admin) do is strengthen
the controls for making things a bit harder in the future.
Thanks again for all the suggestions.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Nick Vaernhoej" <nick.vaernhoej () capitalcardservices com>
To: "security-basics" <security-basics () securityfocus com>
Sent: Monday, November 26, 2007 8:31 PM
Subject: RE: Securing workstations from IT guys
Give them a share on a file server and set up some file access auditing.
You find this in the same area as the NTFS permissions.
Access will be tracked in the event viewer.
With domain admins you can't do much to keep them out (unless money and
staffing is of no concern), but you can audit their access to files.
Here there are files being audited, Snare then forwards event entries to
Kiwi which in turn emails staff on certain criteria. For example, an
email alert goes out when a log entry contains X AND Y.
X being the file/folder name and Y being a user or group in active
directory. Simple but works.
"Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum sonatur."
From: listbounce () securityfocus com [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com]
On Behalf Of WALI
Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2007 12:24 PM
Subject: Securing workstations from IT guys
It's a catch 22 situation and I need to make our Windows Xp workstations
appropriately secure. Secure from rogue Helpdesk personnel as well as
The HR guys are complaining that their 'offer' letters to prospective
employees and some of the CVs that they recieve are finding their way
unwanted hands. I suspect both HR application vulnerability, for which I
undertaking some vulnerability analysis but I also need to protect the
that belong to Dept. of HR employees from rogue IT guys.
Here are the basics of what I intend to do:
1. Advise all HR users to shutdown their PC before they leave for the
2. Change all Local Admin passwords so that even IT helpdesk/other
3. Advise HR guys to assign passwords to their excel/word files.
3. Do not create shares off c drive giving 'everyone' access.
But...because they are all connected to Windows 2003 domain, I still
someone from domain admin group to be able to start C$/D$ share and
into their c: drive, what should I do?
Also, it's easy to crack open xls/doc passwords, what else can be done?
Alternatively, Is there an auditing on PC that can be enabled to
incoming connections to C$ and pop up and alert whenever someone tries
out from a remote machine.
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- Re: Securing workstations from IT guys - topic orginator WALI (Dec 02)