mailing list archives
Re: Laptop - Full Disk Encryption? (Booting defeats FDE)
From: "Tim A." <security-basics () lists goldenpath org>
Date: Thu, 06 Dec 2007 14:23:00 -0500
Yes, but disk encryption is not about intrusion prevention. That's a
If you were running an OS on an encrypted disk, the encrypted disk does
not make the processes of the OS any more secure than if the disk were
not encrypted. The OSs vulnerabilities are still vulnerable, the disk
encryption does not help in that regard. If a user is compromised the
consequences are the same, almost.
Disk encryption is more about mitigation. Just dismount the volume and
capture is moot to the guest, other than being offline (obviously). It's
data is safe, or at least all the data that was not yet captured before
the plug was pulled.
I'm thinking of it more as a computer with a BIOS password that cannot
be blanked out, locked in a room that when the door is closed cannot be
opened except by the owner. It's still a computer, and while the door is
open and the computer is on it's still vulnerable and always will be.
Not saying it's perfect. Nothing is.
Just an idea.
Ansgar -59cobalt- Wiechers wrote:
On 2007-12-06 Tim A. wrote:
Here's a crazy idea:
Run a Virtual Machine inside a TrueCrypt volume.
The VM cannot even be opened until the TrueCrypt volume is mounted.
*Everything* is encrypted, paging file / swap file, OS and User right
down to your CMOS and boot blocks.
How will it preform? Good question. Give it a shot.
Performance issues aside, an attacker will still be able to manipulate
the host operating system, which in turn will be able to manipulate the
guest operating system once the VM is started. Virtual Machines are
designed to protect the host OS from the guest OS, *not* vice versa.