mailing list archives
Re: Admin rights via backdoors
From: "Adam Pridgen" <Adam.Pridgen () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2007 01:41:54 -0600
Out of boredom and curiosity, I spent the better part of my weekend
writing this little demo program. It simulates a back door that could
be hidden in an application. It uses a simple port-knock to figure
out who to connect back too. The source has directions about how to
run the demo, which is attached.
I think with a little bit more attention the code could actually be
trimmed down and hidden well in an application. I am not a hard core
programmer on the win32 platform so the code is somewhat bulky and
rough around the edges, but I think it would help eliminate or at
least reduce the idea that user rights of a developer are not required
on the production machine.
On 3/9/07, Scott Ramsdell <Scott.Ramsdell () cellnet com> wrote:
You can setup a netcat listener on any port and instruct it to execute
any executable when the port is knocked. It will of course inherit the
permissions of the user/service account that launches it.
So, in your specific scenario, the backdoor would contain netcat, open a
listening port and do whatever when knocked. It would execute with the
rights the financial app has (which likely can read and write sensitive
Check it out, it's pretty cool.
Typically dev and prod environments are separate. Once the code is
reviewed and approved, it moves out of dev and into the hands of the
admins who install it, then care and feed for the app. Devs generally
have no rights on prod boxes.
From: listbounce () securityfocus com [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com]
On Behalf Of WALI
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 8:02 AM
To: security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: Admin rights via backdoors
I do understand the risks of seeing open ports on servers using
but need to demonstrate a concept to my managers, the need for
software developers and production environments, especially pertaining
an financial application being built in-house.
I maintain that getting admin rights into an application while bypassing
logical access controls flowing down from Active directory or OS level
trivial for a programmer if he hard codes some backdoor entry ports
with usernames and passwords. They disagree that if they have no AD
granted on the resource (different AD domains / filers etc), there is no
reason to physically isolate developers from production.
Is my contention conceptually correct? How can I demonstrate this with a