mailing list archives
Re: Security Problem ftpd (includes wu.ftpd 2.4 and 2.4.2 beta 4)
From: aleph1 () DFW NET (Aleph One)
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 1995 11:46:04 -0500
On Wed, 12 Jul 1995, James W. Abendschan wrote:
Maybe I'm completely missing the point, but wouldn't this help?
linux# chown root.kmem /proc
linux# chmod 750 /proc
And then sgid kmem all the binaries that need /proc access:
linux# chown root.kmem `which w` `which ps` `which top` (etc)
linux# chmod 2755 `which w` `which ps` `which top` (etc)
This restricts ordinary users from wandering around in /proc, and
thus being able to access the "unclosed" files.
You are. The whole point of /proc is not only make things like ps, w, etc
not to have to go looking into the kernel memeory but also to allow
people easy access to information trough /proc. If we make it group
kmem we might as well dump it and keep doing it the old way.
/proc is a "Good Thing(tm)" just need to figure out the right perms
for the right files.
James Abendschan jwa () nbs nau edu Will Hack For Food
<a href="http://www.nbs.nau.edu/~jwa">Zero Funk Kick</a>
Re: Exploit for Linux wu.ftpd hole Michael Shields (Jul 06)
Why are we using priveleged images / state so much? (Was Re: Paul Robinson (Jul 06)