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Re: SecurID White Paper - A Comment
From: coxa () cableol net (Alan Cox)
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 09:42:45 +0100

powerful freeware packet-manipulation tools like Netcat, it might be about
to explode -- more of us will doubtless choose to buy link or
application-level crypto. But it is, and should always be, a cost/benefit
calculation. Not a bribe to keep the boogieman away.

There is no major cost issue. ssh is free except for a small amount of
extra CPU load. Secure mirroring software using rsync and ssh exists.

        OTPs serve purposes other than safeguarding network TCP links from
session stealing. In many organizations, these are seen as valuable
functions.  OTP tokens offer greater credibility to both audit and

OTP's don't help protect the important stuff. If someone does a session
intercept on your backbone router boy have you got some SERIOUS problems.
Worse with stuff like cisco's a UDP intercept including spraying the
router with a 1st tftp data block including a cisco password waiting for
a boot is just too easy MUCH too easy.

        Mr. Neuman asserts that SecurIDs provide "no additional  benefit"
over reusable passwords when used on a cleartext Internet connection. I
suggest this overstates his case considerably, in light of the current
prevalence of stolen passwords and replay attacks.  [I'm also a little

I think he is close to right. At the end of the day if you get broken into
you get broken into. The simple securID attacks demonstrated show the
weakness of a pure OTP. Other things show the weakness of pure crypted

        When a traveling executive accesses his e-mail server with SecurID
over the Internet, he might possibly be hijacked.  That might be
embarrassing... but it's nothing like the danger involved in having a
Pirate win access the corporate financial reports or development plans, for
instance. That data, if on another server, could (even likely, would)
require an _additional_ SecurID token code... or (perhaps best) might be
simply unavailable through the ACE/Client which serves external network

Pity if someone emailed to to the travelling executive. Its better to have
blanket coverage simply because human beings make regular stupid mistakes,
even the best ones.

first identifier, typically the user's name, as the answer needed to all
race attacks.  (Revising a protocol which has to remain backward compatible
to ACE/Clients imbedded in some 200 network products from some 50 vendors
is an interesting challenge;-)

You mean you forgot to include a secure download and reprogram of the client
units. Ah well


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