mailing list archives
Re: ICMP ECHO_REQUESTS to BROADCAST addresses (fwd)
From: amonk () LABYRINTH CFTNET COM (Kyle Amon)
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 1997 09:59:36 -0500
We're seeing a pernicious sort of DOS attack lately. The
attack takes advantage of hosts IP stack implementation, and how it
deals with ICMP packets to the broadcast address. Basically, the short
and sweet of it is that most hosts will respond to an echo-request to
its broadcast address with an echo reply.
I've noticed the same behavior as well. My first awareness of it came
during an otherwise typical day when, for some now forgotten but presumably
legitimate reason, I decided to ping the broadcast address of the local
subnet. To be quite honest, I think I was mostly just playing around at
the time, but the presumed degredation in network response quickly followed.
This being a class B network with well over a thousand machines, I quickly
checked my arp table to verify the cause and found more MAC addresses than
I was willing to page through, and certainly far more than I had otherwise
recently communicated with.
So imagine this scenario: some disgruntled hax0r forges his
source address to be your web server (or shell server, or irc server,
or whatever) and sends some broadcast pings to a well populated remote
network. His/her ping will be amplified by the number of hosts on the
Yes, the potential here for someone with a *little* time/motivation is
pretty severe. As for myself, I just classified it as a toy not to be
played with during business hours and relegated a small amount of further
experimentation to after hours when everyone else still hanging around was
busily try ing to p lay Doom. ;0
Everyone needs to be doing the following:
1) Keep measured traffic stats, and look at them, using
something like MRTG.
2) Filter all broadcast traffic from coming into your network.
I believe that it's QUITE rare to have an application that
is both *routed* and uses the broadcast address. This is
made harder when you VLSM, but I belive the majority of
networks are provisioned on an 8 bit boundary, so you can
filter 90% of the traffic by filtering to the .255 address.
3) Re-iterating what people have said before, filter outbound
traffic to allow only *your* host traffic from getting out.
This makes you a responsible Internet citizen, and makes it
harder for people to launch attacks like this one.
Anyone doing serious multicasting might want to take some preventive measures
with ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packets to the multicast address as well. I don't
have anything to test it on now, but as I recall, the same behavior, on an
obviously much smaller scale, is present here as well and could likely slip
through router rules if not looked at.
Kyle Amon | email: amonk () labyrinth cftnet com
Unix Systems Administrator | url: http://labyrinth.cftnet.com/kyle
Security Specialist | phone: (203) 486-3290
IBM Global Services | pager: 1-800-759-8888 PIN 1616512
1024/173D96C9 1997/03/06 Kyle Amon <amonk () labyrinth cftnet com>
PGP Key fingerprint = 90 4F 0B D4 2D 37 E7 61 1A 31 7B F2 72 04 66 1A
- Re: ICMP ECHO_REQUESTS to BROADCAST addresses (fwd) Kyle Amon (Jul 22)