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Re: Vulnerability in 4.4BSD Secure Levels Implementation
From: cschuber () uumail gov bc ca (Cy Schubert - ITSD Open Systems Group)
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 1998 18:00:07 -0700
Vulnerability in 4.4BSD Secure Levels Implementation
This vulnerability is significant in that it allows an intruder to
covertly modify running processes. The correct behaviour is to make
the address space of these processes immutable. Although an intruder
can still kill them and start others in their place, the death of system
daemons will (should) draw attention on secure systems.
The key word is "should" draw attention. Unless there is an
application (or the system itself) that periodically checks for any
change in status of a system daemon (like the change of a PID), I
suspect that most sysadmins will not even notice that a system daemon
has died and restarted. To help plug this vulnerability one of the
following options might be desirable,
1. Disallow sending signals to processes started from immutable
except from init, e.g. during shutdown.
Advantage: Improved security.
Disadvantages: Administration may be virtually impossible and may
1a. A variation of #1 except using a new "unkillable" flag which denotes
immutable binaries that cannot be sent signals.
Advantage: May break fewer applications than #1.
2. Have init manage critical system daemons via /etc/ttys. When a
daemon dies, automatically restart a new one.
Advantage: Administratively more palatable.
Disadvantage: Race condition possible to replace a system daemon
3. Replicate the immutable flag when a file is copied.
Advantage: Some improved security.
Disadvantage: Intruder can FTP a rogue daemon and run it instead.
Regards, Phone: (250)387-8437
Cy Schubert Fax: (250)387-5766
Open Systems Group Internet: cschuber () uumail gov bc ca
ITSD Cy.Schubert () gems8 gov bc ca
Government of BC