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CERT Advisory CA-99-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice AdminSuite Daemon sadmind
From: aleph1 () SECURITYFOCUS COM (Elias Levy)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 21:00:57 -0800
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CERT Advisory CA-99-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice AdminSuite Daemon
Original release date: December 14, 1999
Last revised: --
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
* Systems that have sadmind installed
The sadmind program is installed by default in Solaris 2.5, 2.6, and
7. In Solaris 2.3 and 2.4, sadmind may be installed if the Sun
Solstice Adminsuite packages are installed. The sadmind program is
installed in /usr/sbin. It can be used to coordinate distributed
system administration operations remotely. The sadmind daemon is
started automatically by the inetd daemon whenever a request to
perform a system administration operation is received.
All versions of sadmind are vulnerable to a buffer overflow that can
overwrite the stack pointer within a running sadmind process. Since
sadmind is installed as root, it is possible to execute arbitrary
code with root privileges on a remote machine.
This vulnerability has been discussed in public security forums and is
actively being exploited by intruders.
A remote user may be able to execute arbitrary code with root
privileges on systems running vulnerable versions of sadmind.
Remove (or comment) the following line in /etc/inetd.conf:
100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind
Even though it will not defend against the attack discussed in this
advisory, it is a good practice to set the security option used to
authenticate requests to a STRONG level, for example:
100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind -S 2
If you must use sadmind to perform system administration tasks, we
urge you to use this setting.
Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
We will update the appendix as we receive or develop more information.
If you do not see your vendor's name in Appendix A, the CERT/CC did
not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
Appendix A. Vendor Information
Sun Microsystems is currently working on patches to address the issue
discussed in this advisory and recommends disabling sadmind.
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Sun Microsystems for its help in
providing information for this advisory.
This document is available from:
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert () cert org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
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December 14, 1999: Initial release
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sshd1 allows unencrypted sessions regardless of server policy Markus Friedl (Dec 14)
SSH-1.2.27 & RSAREF2 exploit Iván Arce (Dec 14)
SSH 1 Why? Daniel P. Zepeda (Dec 15)
Re: SSH 1 Why? Emiliano Kargieman (Dec 15)
Re: SSH 1 Why? Emiel Kollof (Dec 15)