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Bugtraq: Advisory: mailman local compromise

Advisory: mailman local compromise

From: Stan Bubrouski <secnet_at_CROSSWINDS.NET>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2000 13:14:20 -0400

Author : Stan Bubrouski
Date : August 1, 2000
Package : mailman
Versions affected : 2.0beta3 (released: 2000-Jun-28 23:25)
                              2.0beta4 (released: 2000-Jul-06 21:27)
Severity : access to group mailman binaries are installed as
which (usually mailman).
                              Most directories in a mailman install are
mode 2755 as are most of the
                              binaries and scripts. Many configurations
are 664 allowing a local user
                              to change list ocnfigurations and even read
the adm.pw passwd file.
                              Additionally besides being able to read
public and private data along with
                              passwds, a malicious user could replace
binaries and scripts in a mailman
                              installation because they are writable by
group mailman.
Problem : The mailman package comes with a sgid program named
wrapper. This
                              program contains a function named fatal()
which is used to display error
                              messages. Unfortunately it fails to send the
correct amount of arguments
                              to the fprintf(3) function allowing users to
add formatting which could
                              be used to insert and execute code under
group mailman. fatal()
                              is called when invalid arguments are provided
and in such a case, the invalid
                              arguments are sent to fprintf without being
formatted, the same goes for argv[0].
Example:

[user_at_king user]$ ls -al /usr/share/mailman/mail/wrapper
-rwxr-sr-x 1 mailman mailman 36290 Jul 1 06:48
/usr/share/mailman/mail/wrapper
[user_at_king user]$ cd /usr/share/mailman/mail
[user_at_king mail]$ ls -al
total 39
drwxrwsr-x 2 mailman mailman 1024 Jul 12 19:29 .
drwxrwsr-x 16 mailman mailman 1024 Jul 27 20:13 ..
-rwxr-sr-x 1 mailman mailman 36290 Jul 1 06:48 wrapper
[user_at_king mail]$ ./wrapper
Usage: ./wrapper program [args...]
[user_at_king mail]$ ./wrapper %s
Illegal command: Illegal command: %s[user_at_king mail]$ ./wrapper %s%s
Illegal command: Illegal command: %s%s•ýÿ¿œ=@„üÿ¿Xüÿ¿€>@[user_at_king
mail]$ ./wrapper %s%s%s
Segmentation fault
[user_at_king mail]$ ./wrapper %s%u%p
Illegal command: Illegal command: %s%u%p32212244600x656c6c49[user_at_king mail]$
[user_at_king mail]$ doexec ./wrapper %s
Usage: Usage: %s program [args...]
  program [args...]
[user_at_king mail]$ doexec ./wrapper %s%s
Usage: Usage: %s%s program [args...]
“ýÿ¿œ=@„üÿ¿Xüÿ¿€>@ program [args...]
[user_at_king mail]$ doexec ./wrapper %s%p
Usage: Usage: %s%p program [args...]
0xbffffc0c program [args...]
[user_at_king mail]$ doexec ./wrapper %s%S%u
Usage: Usage: %s%S%u program [args...]
[user_at_king mail]$ doexec ./wrapper %s%s
Usage: Usage: %s%s program [args...]
“ýÿ¿œ=@„üÿ¿Xüÿ¿€>@ program [args...]
[user_at_king mail]$ doexec ./wrapper %s%s%s
Segmentation fault
[user_at_king mail]$

Patch:
diff -u -r ./cgi-wrapper.c.orig ./cgi-wrapper.c
--- ./cgi-wrapper.c.orig Tue Mar 21 01:26:41 2000
+++ ./cgi-wrapper.c Fri Jul 28 00:17:42 2000
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
         fake_argv[2] = script;

         status = run_script("driver", 3, fake_argv, env);
- fatal(logident, status, "%s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal(logident, status, "%s\n", strerror(errno));
         return status;
  }

diff -u -r common.c.orig ./common.c
--- ./common.c.orig Mon May 22 14:59:31 2000
+++ ./common.c Thu Jul 27 23:58:12 2000
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
                 printf("</pre>\n");
         }
         else
- fprintf(stderr, log_entry);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", log_entry);
  #endif /* HELPFUL */
         exit(exitcode);
  }
diff -u -r ./mail-wrapper.c.orig ./mail-wrapper.c
--- ./mail-wrapper.c.orig Tue Mar 21 01:26:41 2000
+++ ./mail-wrapper.c Fri Jul 28 00:16:34 2000
@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@

         if (!check_command(argv[1]))
                 fatal(logident, MAIL_ILLEGAL_COMMAND,
- "Illegal command: %s", argv[1]);
+ "Illegal command: %s\n", argv[1]);

         check_caller(logident, parentgid);

         /* If we got here, everything must be OK */
         status = run_script(argv[1], argc, argv, env);
- fatal(logident, status, "%s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal(logident, status, "%s\n", strerror(errno));
         return status;
  }

Patch info : The patch fixes fatal() and also adds newlines to
some fatal() calls because
                              fatal() does not tack them on and as you can
see in the example above, the
                              lack of newlines in some calls make errors
harder to read. I made the patch
                              using the latest CVS tree but it should apply
to beta3 and beta4 releases as well.
Received on Aug 01 2000

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