Home page logo

bugtraq logo Bugtraq mailing list archives

Re: Tempfile vulnerabilities
From: antirez () INVECE ORG (antirez)
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 12:16:09 +0100

On Wed, Feb 02, 2000 at 02:36:20PM -0700, Theo de Raadt wrote:
The terrible /tmp race handling aside...

I suppose then that anyone who attacks a machine which relies on
/dev/random -- a world readable device -- should do the following:

      cat /dev/random > /dev/null &

Crypto software which uses those devices should be doing some kind of
checking to make sure that they are getting at least good entropy.  I

Sure but there is another problem, while evil user exec 'cat /dev/random >
 /dev/null &' maybe that the following results in an infinite loop:

while(there_are_enougt_entropy() == 0)
/* race -- what if the evil user starts to deplate the entropy pool here? */

Can be so easy to DoS cryptographic software?

Of course all insecure cgi scripts or daemons may be used to pool from
/dev/random remotely. An example? the old TERM="../../../bla" problem.


  By Date           By Thread  

Current thread:
[ Nmap | Sec Tools | Mailing Lists | Site News | About/Contact | Advertising | Privacy ]