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Re: Announcing RSX - non exec stack/heap module
From: <zen-parse () gmx net>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2001 22:40:06 +1200 (NZST)

So now assume we doesn't link the libc-plt to the real libc location -
instead we link it to a intermediate random glue code piece. The
protection arises from the fact that it is hard to guess the location of
this intermediate glue segment (and it is hard to guess the real libc
vma too). So the attacker neither easily jump into some offset (skipping
the ret checking code) in the glue code, nor directly jump into some
real libc function. The addresses of the glue code and libc should
change with every execve() and fork() (to prevent binary search...).

What about /proc/$$/maps ?
pr--r--r--    1 root     root            0 Jun 13 22:18 /proc/21156/maps|

I suppose this could be made to lie, or just not be readable by other.

I haven't actually been following this, so I may have missed something...
but just a thought about how to maybe beat that?





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