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Re: The Dangers of Allowing Users to Post Images
From: David Dreezer <bugtraq () infopop com>
Date: 14 Jun 2001 23:27:58 -0000

This exploit shows how almost any script that 
uses cookie session/login data
to validate CGI forms can be exploited if the 
users can post images.

One of our developers, Chris 'stallion' Lambert 
( clambert () whitecrown net ),
discovered this exploit in a routine internal 
security audit.

Allowing users to post inline images is 
potentially a bad thing. Having the
user authentication based solely on cookies is 
another potentially bad
thing. When you put them together, it gets a 
whole lot worse. I will explain
this problem with reference to a typical forum 
system, but naturally, it can
be extended to almost any other CGI script, not 
just limited to PHP scripts.
We have also tested this with Infopop's Ultimate 
Bulletin Board 6.04e,
ezboard 6.2 and WWW Threads PHP 5.4, and at the 
time of writing, all three
were susceptible to attack.

What is the problem? Well, by using an [img] (or 
HTML <img> or <iframe> or
<script src="">) tag, the user is having anyone 
who views the thread access
that image - that is perform an HTTP GET on the 
URL specified for the image.
Even if its not an image, it still can be 
accessed, but will display a
broken image. This means that the user can put a 
CGI script inside [img]
tags. This script will be called by whoever 
views that thread. When used
maliciously, it could force the user to: 
unknowingly update their profile,
respond to polls in a certain way, post new 
messages or threads, email a
user with whatever text they want, the list goes 
on. This would be
particularly worrying for a 'worm' to spread 
through a forum, filling it
with rubbish posts.

For example, if a user posted something along 
these lines:

[img]http://your.forums/forums/newreply.cgi?action
=newthread&subject=aaa&bod
y=some+naughty+words&submit=go[/img]
Then the post would go through, under the name 
of whoever viewed the image.
This is of particular danger when an 
administrator views an image, which
then calls a page in an online control panel - 
thus granting the user access
to the control panel.

How can it be fixed? Well, there are a couple of 
ways to stop it, but the
easiest (in PHP at least) seems to be to have 
most of the variables used by
scripts be used through $HTTP_POST_VARS. So 
instead of checking for $action
in a script, $HTTP_POST_VARS['action'] would be 
checked. This forces the
user to use a POST request, not a GET. 
Alternatively, the sessionid could be
required to come with the GET/POST request 
variables, rather than by cookie.
Finally, in the specific case of [img] tags, the 
use of ? or & in the img
URL can be disabled by some regexes.

If the software that you run is not secure, we 
recommend that you disable
HTML and/or [img] tags, until the fixes have 
been implemented.

Known Vulnerable: Infopop's UBB 6.04e (probably 
the whole 6.xx series),
ezboard 6.2, WWW Threads PHP 5.4, vBulletin 
2.0.0 Release Candidate 2 and
before (later versions are safe). Probably many 
more bulletin boards and CGI
scripts out there, but those are the main ones 
that we have been tested
positive.


John Percival
Product Manager, vBulletin

http://www.vbulletin.com/
mailto:john () vbulletin com

"vBulletin: Community Instantly"



Copyright 2001 Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd


 
Infopop Corporation's current version of the 
Ultimate Bulletin Board™ Version, 6.04f (released 
06-12-2001 05:58 PM), does not have this 
vulnerability. Our OpenTopic™ product has never 
had this vulnerability.


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