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RE: File extensions spoofable in MSIE download dialog
From: "Jonathan G. Lampe" <jonathan () stdnet com>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 12:00:21 -0600

I could not reproduce this problem with semi-current versions of the latest browsers.

In all instances where I attempted to force an executable, binary file across the wire in response to a request for a text file either: 1) an ASCII representation of the executable file was loaded into a notepad.exe (as a file with the usual ".log" extension would be)
2) I was asked by a dialog whether I wanted to open or save "gotcha.exe"

In no instance was I able to "silently" download and execute an executable in response to a request for a text file.

These are the two browsers I tested with:
IE 5.50.4522.1800 SP1, Q299618
IE 6.0.2600.0000 Update Q312461

Here's the ASP I tried to use to test this one.
(Adapted from one of Microsoft's recommendations on how to push binary files from ASPs. http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q276/4/88.asp )

I tried the following four variations in my test: (Comment/uncomment the lines!)
1. Bogus Content Type, No Attachment Header
2. octet Content Type, No Attachment Header
3. Bogus Content Type, Attachment Header
4. octet Content Type, Attachment Header

<%

Const adTypeBinary = 1
Dim strFilePath
Dim Name

Name = "gotcha.exe"

'Set the content type to the specific type that you are sending.
'Response.ContentType = "application/definitely-not-in-your-list"
Response.ContentType = "application/octet-stream"
'Response.AddHeader "Content-Disposition","attachment; filename=""" & Name & """"

strFilePath = Server.MapPath(".") & "\frhed.exe"

Response.Write strFilePath

Set objStream = Server.CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
objStream.Open
objStream.Type = adTypeBinary
objStream.LoadFromFile strFilePath

Response.BinaryWrite objStream.Read

objStream.Close
Set objStream = Nothing
%>

Here's the .htm from which testing was initiated.

<html>

<head>
<title></title>
</head>

<body>

<p>This is a test</p>

<p><a href="frhed.exe">Click here for an .exe</a></p>

<p><a href="frhed.txt">Click here for a .txt</a></p>

<p><a href="frhed.log">Click here for a .log</a></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
</body>
</html>

In addition, I set up a directory on an IIS server with the following files in it: (BTW, frhed is the name of a great bin/hex editor - just the first exe I grabbed for testing!)
  - frhed.htm
  - frhed.txt (text file)
  - frhed.exe (executable)
  - frhed.log (ASP file as defined above)

Finally, I enabled the ".log" extension as an ".asp" extension clone.

Regards,

- Jonathan G. Lampe
- Standard Networks, Inc.
- 608.227.6100
- jonathan () stdnet com

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Other Info

My company had a usability issue with Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0 and 5.5 which may be related to this behavior. (One of our web applications builds files on the fly when called. Early versions of IE 5.0/5.5 displayed and saved the filename of the "referring page" rather than the filename and contents we were trying to push down to the user with a function similar to the one above.) Our issue seemed to be magically resolved in an IE security rollup patch. (Go here - http://www2.stdnet.com/sans/silocksupportbulletin01.pdf - for more information on this.)

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Original Report Follows
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OVERVIEW
A flaw in Microsoft Internet Explorer allows a malicious website to spoof
file extensions in the download dialog to make an executable program file
look like a text, image, audio, or any other file. If the user chooses to
open the file from its current location, the executable program will be
run, circumventing Security Warning dialogs, and the attacker could gain
control over the user's system.
A piece of HTML can be used to cause a normal download dialog to pop up.
The dialog would prompt the user to choose whether he/she wants to "open
this file from its current location" or "save this file to disk". The
file name and extension may be anything the malicious website
administrator (or a user having access there) wishes, e.g. README.TXT,
index.html, or sample.wav. If the user chooses the first alternative,
"open the file from its current location", an .EXE application is
actually run without any further dialogs. This happens even if
downloading a normal .EXE file from the server causes a Security Warning
dialog.
The user has no way of detecting that the file is really an .EXE
program and not a text, html, or other harmless file. The program could
quietly backdoor or infect the user's system, and then pop up a window
which does what the user expected, ie. show a text document or
play an audio file.
No active scripting is necessary in order to exploit the flaw. The
malicious website can be refered e.g. in an iframe, in a normal link, or
by javascript.


DETAILS
The flaw is in the way Internet Explorer processes certain kind of URLs
and HTTP headers. No further technical details are disclosed this time,
as there is no proper workaround and the vulnerability could be
relatively easily and unnoticeably exploited to spread virii, install
DDoS zombies or backdoors, format harddisks, and so on.
The flaw has been successfully exploited with Internet Explorer 5.5 and
6. An IE5 with the latest updates shows the spoofed file name and
extension without a sign of EXE, and issue no Security Warning dialog
after the file download dialog.
Internet Explorer 6 is exploitable in a slightly different way, but the
effect is the same. The user gets a download dialog with the spoofed file
name and extension, and can choose between "Open" and "Save". Opening the
file causes the program to be run.
Older versions such as IE5.0 behave somewhat differently. The dialog
indicates the user is about to execute an application; the dialog has the
word "execute" instead of "open", and a Security Warning dialog appears
after choosing "execute". It still shows the spoofed file name and
extension instead of "EXE".
Any way to skip all dialogs, ie. to run an application without ANY
dialog with this vulnerability has NOT been found. In all variations of
the exploit there is always the normal file download dialog, but the
following Security Warning dialog is skipped.
Technical details of the vulnerability will be revealed later.


WORKAROUNDS
Opening a file type previously considered safe, e.g. plain text or HTML
file isn't safe with IE. Users of the browser should avoid opening
files directly and save them to disk instead (if opening them is
necessary at all). If this flaw is being exploited, the file save dialog
will reveal that the file is actually an executable program. Dealing with
files from an untrusted source isn't advisable anyway. Another workaround
is switching to another browser such as Opera or Netscape which don't
seem to have this vulnerability.


VENDOR STATUS
Microsoft was contacted on November 19th. The company doesn't currently
consider this is a vulnerability; they say that the trust decision should
be based on the file source and not type. The origin of the file, ie. the
web server's hostname can't be spoofed with this flaw. It's not known
whether a patch is going to be produced. Microsoft is currently
investigating the issue.


--
Jouko Pynnonen Online Solutions Ltd Secure your Linux -
jouko () solutions fi http://www.solutions.fi http://www.secmod.com

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Original Report Above
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