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CERT Advisory CA-2002-19 Buffer Overflow in Multiple DNS Resolver Libraries
From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory () cert org>
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 17:17:10 -0400 (EDT)



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CERT Advisory CA-2002-19 Buffer Overflow in Multiple DNS Resolver Libraries

   Original release date: June 28, 2002
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

   Applications  using  vulnerable  implementations  of  the  Domain Name
   System  (DNS)  resolver  libraries, which include, but are not limited
   to:

     * Internet  Software  Consortium (ISC) Berkeley Internet Name Domain
       (BIND) DNS resolver library (libbind)

     * Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) DNS resolver library (libc)


Overview

   A  buffer overflow vulnerability exists in multiple implementations of
   DNS  resolver  libraries.  Operating  systems  and  applications  that
   utilize  vulnerable  DNS  resolver libraries may be affected. A remote
   attacker who is able to send malicious DNS responses could potentially
   exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial
   of service on a vulnerable system.


I. Description

   The  DNS  protocol provides name, address, and other information about
   Internet   Protocol   (IP)   networks   and  devices.  To  access  DNS
   information,  a  network  application uses the resolver to perform DNS
   queries  on its behalf. Resolver functionality is commonly implemented
   in libraries that are included with operating systems.

   Multiple  implementations of DNS resolver libraries contain a remotely
   exploitable  buffer  overflow  vulnerability  in  the way the resolver
   handles  DNS  responses.  Both  BSD  (libc) and ISC (libbind) resolver
   libraries share a common code base and are vulnerable to this problem;
   any DNS resolver implementation that derives code from either of these
   libraries  may also be vulnerable. Network applications that makes use
   of  vulnerable resolver libraries are likely to be affected, therefore
   this problem is not limited to DNS or BIND servers.

   Vulnerability   Note  VU#803539  lists  the  vendors  that  have  been
   contacted about this vulnerability:

     http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/803539

   This  vulnerability is not the same as the Sendmail issue discussed in
   Vulnerability Note VU#814627:

     http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/814627


II. Impact

   An attacker who is able to send malicious DNS responses could remotely
   exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial
   of  service  on  vulnerable systems. Any code executed by the attacker
   would run with the privileges of the process that calls the vulnerable
   resolver function.

   Note that an attacker could cause one of the victim's network services
   to  make  a  DNS request to a DNS server under the attacker's control.
   This would permit the attacker to remotely exploit this vulnerability.


III. Solution

   Upgrade to a corrected version of the DNS resolver libraries

     Note   that   DNS  resolver  libraries  can  be  used  by  multiple
     applications  on  most  systems.  It may be necessary to upgrade or
     apply   multiple  patches  and  then  recompile  statically  linked
     applications.

     Applications  that  are  statically linked must be recompiled using
     patched  resolver  libraries.  Applications  that  are  dynamically
     linked do not need to be recompiled; however, running services need
     to be restarted in order to use the patched resolver libraries.

     System  administrators  should  consider the following process when
     addressing this issue:

    1. Patch or obtain updated resolver libraries.

    2. Restart  any  dynamically  linked  services  that  make use of the
       resolver libraries.

    3. Recompile  any statically linked applications using the patched or
       updated resolver libraries.

   Use a local caching DNS server

     Using  a  local  caching DNS server that reconstructs DNS responses
     will  prevent  malicious  responses  from  reaching  systems  using
     vulnerable DNS resolver libraries. For example, BIND 9 reconstructs
     responses  in this way, with the exception of forwarded dynamic DNS
     update  messages.  Note  that  BIND  8  does  not  reconstruct  all
     responses;  therefore  this  workaround  may  not be effective when
     using BIND 8 as a caching DNS server.


Appendix A. - Vendor Information

   This  appendix  contains  information  provided  by  vendors  for this
   advisory.  When  vendors  report  new  information  to the CERT/CC, we
   update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
   particular  vendor  is  not  listed  below, we have not received their
   comments.

Compaq

     SOURCE:  Compaq  Computer Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
     Hewlett-Packard  Company  and  Hewlett-Packard  Company HP Services
     Software Security Response Team

     x-ref:SSRT2270

     At   the  time  of  writing  this  document,  Compaq  is  currently
     investigating  the  potential impact to Compaq's released Operating
     System software products.

     As further information becomes available Compaq will provide notice
     of  the  completion/availibility  of  any necessary patches through
     standard   product  and  security  bulletin  announcements  and  be
     available from your normal HP Services support channel.

Cray, Inc.

     The  DNS  resolver  code  supplied  by  Cray,  Inc.  in  Unicos and
     Unicos/mk  is  vulnerable. SPR 722619 has been opened to track this
     problem.

FreeBSD

     See
     ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-02:28.
     resolv.asc

GNU adns

     adns  is  not derived from BIND libresolv. Furthermore, it does not
     support  a  gethostbyname-like interface (which is where the bug in
     BIND libresolv is). Therefore, it is not vulnerable.

     For more information on GNU adns, see:

     http://www.gnu.org/software/adns/
     http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~ian/adns/

Internet Software Consortium

     All  versions  of  BIND  4  from  4.8.3  prior  to  BIND  4.9.9 are
     vulnerable.
     All versions of BIND 8 prior to BIND 8.2.6 are vulnerable.
     All versions of BIND 8.3.x prior to BIND 8.3.3 are vulnerable.
     BIND versions BIND 9.2.0 and BIND 9.2.1 are vulnerable.
     BIND version 4.8 does not appear to be vulnerable.
     BIND versions BIND 9.0.x and BIND 9.1.x are not vulnerable.
     'named' itself is not vulnerable.
     Updated releases can be found at:

     ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/4.9.9/
     ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/8.2.6/
     ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/8.3.3/
     ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/contrib/ntbind-8.3.3/

     BIND  9  contains  a  copy  of  the  BIND  8.3.x  resolver  library
     (lib/bind).  This  will  be  updated  with the next BIND 9 releases
     (9.2.2/9.3.0)  in  the  meantime  please  use  the original in BIND
     8.3.3.

     In  addition  the  BIND  9 'named' can be used to prevent malformed
     answers reaching vulnerable clients.

     Vendors     wishing     additional     patches    should    contact
     bind-bugs () isc org 
     Query   about   BIND   4   and   BIND  8  should  be  addressed  to
     bind-bugs () isc org 
     Query about BIND 9 should be addressed to bind9-bugs () isc org 

Microsoft

     Microsoft  products do not use the libraries in question. Microsoft
     products are not affected by this issue.

OpenBSD

     [T]he  resolver libraries in question got copied far and wide. They
     used to have a hell of a lot of bugs in them.

     Now  might  be  a  good  time  for  people  to compare each others'
     libraries  to  each other. I would urge them to compare against the
     OpenBSD  ones, where we've spent a lot of time on, but of course we
     still  missed  this. But perhaps people can then share some around.
     Not  everyone is going to move to the bind9 stuff, since it is very
     different.

NetBSD

     See
     ftp://ftp.NetBSD.ORG/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2002-0
     06.txt.asc

Network Appliance

     Some  NetApp  systems  are  vulnerable  to  this problem. Check NOW
     (http://now.netapp.com)  for  information on whether your system is
     vulnerable  and  the  appropriate  patch  release  that  you should
     install.

SGI

     SGI is looking into the matter.


     _________________________________________________________________

   The  CERT  Coordination  Center  thanks Joost Pol of PINE-CERT and the
   FreeBSD Project for their analysis of these vulnerabilities.
     _________________________________________________________________

   Feedback  can  be  directed  to  the  authors: Art Manion and Jason A.
   Rafail
     _________________________________________________________________


Appendix B. - References

    1. http://www.pine.nl/advisories/pine-cert-20020601.asc

   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-19.html
   ______________________________________________________________________


CERT/CC Contact Information

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          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
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          U.S.A.

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Revision History

   June 28, 2002:  Initial release

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