mailing list archives
Re: Buffer overflow prevention
From: Peter Busser <peter () trusteddebian org>
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 11:54:54 +0200
AFAIK all those combined do bring real security against generic exploits.
"Real security" is not the word.
Even though PaX is better than W^X, it is far from being perfect.
PaX / Propolice / W^X / non-exec stacks don't solve bugs. What they do is
to _abort_ execution of a process when it behaves abnormally.
So instead of giving attackers the opportunity to run arbitrary code, you
only give them the ability to cause a denial of service.
You could say they trade availability for integrity.
This kind of protection should be coupled with tools that automatically
restart daemons when they crash (ex: daemontools and monit) to actually keep
the service running when under attack. Still, all of this is a couple of
A better way to deal with would be to automatically warn someone with enough
information to easily find and fix the problem. Restarting the daemon makes the
problem managable, but it won't solve the bug.
The Adamantix Project
Taking trustworthy software out of the labs, and into the real world
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Thomas Sjögren (Aug 14)
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Shaun Clowes (Aug 15)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention, (continued)