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Re: OpenSSH/PAM timing attack allows remote users identification
From: Karl-Heinz Haag <k.haag () linux-ag com>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2003 02:56:31 +0200
Quoting Marco Ivaldi (raptor () mediaservice net):
Security Advisory @ Mediaservice.net Srl
(#01, 30/04/2003) Data Security Division
Title: OpenSSH/PAM timing attack allows remote users identification
Application: OpenSSH-portable <= 3.6.1p1
Platform: Linux, maybe others
Description: A remote attacker can identify valid users on vulnerable
systems, all PAM-enabled systems are potentially affected
Author: Marco Ivaldi <raptor () mediaservice net>
Contributors: Maurizio Agazzini <inode () mediaservice net>,
Solar Designer <solar () openwall com>,
Andrea Ghirardini <pila () pilasecurity com>
Vendor Status: OpenSSH team notified on 12/04/2003,
vendor-sec list notified on 28/04/2003
CVE Candidate: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project has assigned
the name CAN-2003-0190 to this issue.
References: http://lab.mediaservice.net/advisory/2003-01-openssh.txt
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0190
1. Abstract.
During a pen-test we stumbled across a nasty bug in OpenSSH-portable with PAM
support enabled (via the --with-pam configure script switch). This bug allows a
remote attacker to identify valid users on vulnerable systems, through a simple
timing attack. The vulnerability is easy to exploit and may have high severity,
if combined with poor password policies and other security problems that allow
local privilege escalation.
2. Example Attack Session.
root () voodoo:~# ssh [valid_user] () lab mediaservice net
[valid_user] () lab mediaservice net's password: <- arbitrary (non-null) string
[2 secs delay]
Permission denied, please try again.
root () voodoo:~# ssh [no_such_user] () lab mediaservice net
[no_such_user] () lab mediaservice net's password: <- arbitrary (non-null) string
[no delay]
Permission denied, please try again.
4. Fix.
The "Fix" is to encourage all users/admins of OpenSSH to _only_ work
with key authentication (preferable only ssh2 protocol) on all ssh servers.
Switch the default:
PasswordAuthentication yes
Into:
PasswordAuthentication no
in sshd_config
In combination with the default "RSAAuthentication yes" it results in:
,--------
| kh () i4x:~$ ssh dodo () i4x <-dodo=no_such_user
| [no delay]
| Permission denied (publickey).
`--------
The same as:
,--------
| kh () i4x:~$ ssh root () i4x
| [no delay]
| Permission denied (publickey).
`--------
That would be my 2Cent.
Karl-Heinz
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