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RE: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens and smartcards
From: Dana Hudes <dhudes () tcp-ip info>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2004 14:48:05 -0400 (EDT)

as I understand it a "PIN Card" is a card with an EEPROM on it that
contains a PIN.  Possibly encrypted but its the same effect as any other 
file. The host decides if the PIN matches. 

A smart card has onboard microprocessor with software that includes 
encryption support (in my day it was DES). The reader presents the PIN to 
the card and the *card* not only can authenticate but also provide 
authorization information (or any other supplementary response,
such as not just a PGP  key pair (i.e. the secret and public keys) but the 
user's keyring as well. Even more interesting and useful is the use of 
this card to run algorithms to provide one-time pad ciphers. 
While you could do that host-based from a regular EEPROM card it requires 
that the host know the pad selection algorithm . 




 On Fri, 6 Aug 2004 Bart.Lansing () kohls com 
wrote:


Guys...

RSA has been doing PIN cards for ages...I don't get the hangup on 
SmartCards vs "plain old" something you have/something you know two factor

http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1311

Cost of entry/ownership is nothing remotely close to the $1000 you mention 
Lyal...in fact, it's under 1/10 of that on a per seat basis...

Why get hung up on it being a smartcard, when you can do two factor with a 
much lower entry cost and do it, frankly, easier?

Bart Lansing
Manager, Desktop Services
Kohl's IT


full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com wrote on 08/05/2004 08:45:33 PM:

This exposure, of PIN compromise, is genric in all smartcard products 
today,
unless a dedicated PINpad or biometric-sensor  equipped readers are used 
-
putting cost of ownership towards $1000 in some cases.
PC/SC doesn't help - as a data interfcae API spec, it excludes human
interface aspects.  STIP (Small Terminal Interoperability Platform at
www.stip.org) moves in this direction, but has evolved into many 
variants to
interoperate with proprietary vendors and proprietary industry 
standards.

The challenges in putting biometric sensors or PINpads onto cards 
include
the need to conform to ISO 7816 for form factor, physical resilience 
etc,
and that the cards are unpowered.  Or, someone redesigns the entire
form-factor, user interface model, portability and business model -
something that has previously failed to go anywhere.

Something like a mobile phone or PDA is a good compromise tool to this
overall exposure, imho.

Lyal



-----Original Message-----
From: Kevin Sheldrake [mailto:kev () electriccat co uk] 
Sent: Thursday, 5 August 2004 8:39 PM
To: Toomas Soome; lionel.ferette () belnet be
Cc: vuln () hexview com; full-disclosure () lists netsys com;
bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's
tokens and smartcards


Surely if the user is entering a passphrase then the same problem exists 
- 
that of effectively eavesdropping that communication from the keyboard?

Ignoring the initial expense for a moment, wouldn't it have made a lot 
of 
sense to include the keypad actually on the cards?  Obviously, card 
readers would need to be contructed such that the keypad part of the 
card 
would be exposed during use.  The keypad security could then rely on the 
 
tamper resistant properties of the rest of the card.

 From a costs perspective, I would guess that the actual per-card cost 
increase would be minimal if hundreds of millions of these cards were 
produced.

Kev


Lionel Ferette wrote:

Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not 
 
only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart 
cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The 
conclusion 
has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC, and the 
attacker has means to install software on the system (through 
directed 
viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
 The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered 
using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack 
raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms, 
because 
there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached pin pad 
(at 
the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).


at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement 
secured 
communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that widely 
in 
use....  how many card owners are prepared to remember both PIN codes 
and passphrases...

toomas





-- 
Kevin Sheldrake MEng MIEE CEng CISSP
Electric Cat (Bournemouth) Ltd


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