RSA has been doing PIN cards for ages...I don't get the hangup on
SmartCards vs "plain old" something you have/something you know two factor
Cost of entry/ownership is nothing remotely close to the $1000 you mention
Lyal...in fact, it's under 1/10 of that on a per seat basis...
Why get hung up on it being a smartcard, when you can do two factor with a
much lower entry cost and do it, frankly, easier?
Manager, Desktop Services
full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com wrote on 08/05/2004 08:45:33 PM:
This exposure, of PIN compromise, is genric in all smartcard products
unless a dedicated PINpad or biometric-sensor equipped readers are used
putting cost of ownership towards $1000 in some cases.
PC/SC doesn't help - as a data interfcae API spec, it excludes human
interface aspects. STIP (Small Terminal Interoperability Platform at
www.stip.org) moves in this direction, but has evolved into many
interoperate with proprietary vendors and proprietary industry
The challenges in putting biometric sensors or PINpads onto cards
the need to conform to ISO 7816 for form factor, physical resilience
and that the cards are unpowered. Or, someone redesigns the entire
form-factor, user interface model, portability and business model -
something that has previously failed to go anywhere.
Something like a mobile phone or PDA is a good compromise tool to this
overall exposure, imho.
From: Kevin Sheldrake [mailto:kev () electriccat co uk]
Sent: Thursday, 5 August 2004 8:39 PM
To: Toomas Soome; lionel.ferette () belnet be
Cc: vuln () hexview com; full-disclosure () lists netsys com;
bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's
tokens and smartcards
Surely if the user is entering a passphrase then the same problem exists
that of effectively eavesdropping that communication from the keyboard?
Ignoring the initial expense for a moment, wouldn't it have made a lot
sense to include the keypad actually on the cards? Obviously, card
readers would need to be contructed such that the keypad part of the
would be exposed during use. The keypad security could then rely on the
tamper resistant properties of the rest of the card.
From a costs perspective, I would guess that the actual per-card cost
increase would be minimal if hundreds of millions of these cards were
Lionel Ferette wrote:
Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not
only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart
cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The
has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC, and the
attacker has means to install software on the system (through
viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered
using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack
raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms,
there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached pin pad
the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement
communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that widely
use.... how many card owners are prepared to remember both PIN codes
Kevin Sheldrake MEng MIEE CEng CISSP
Electric Cat (Bournemouth) Ltd
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
This is a transmission from Kohl's Department Stores, Inc.
and may contain information which is confidential and proprietary.
If you are not the addressee, any disclosure, copying or distribution or use of the contents of this message is
If you have received this transmission in error, please destroy it and notify us immediately at 262-703-7000.
Internet and e-mail communications are Kohl's property and Kohl's reserves the right to retrieve and read any message
created, sent and received. Kohl's reserves the right to monitor messages by authorized Kohl's Associates at any time
without any further consent.