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bugtraq logo Bugtraq mailing list archives

RE: EEYE: Microsoft ASN.1 Library Length Overflow Heap Corruption
From: Bill Gallagher <Bill.Gallagher () augharue com>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 09:12:37 -0000


...
In order to trigger the ASN.1 vulnerabilities an attacker has 
to be able
to get the target machine to invoke its BER decoding capabilities.  

I have read a good number of the posts here regarding this vulnerability and
have seen references to NTLM etc. as a pathway for attack. What about SNMP?,
it certainly uses ASN.1. Does MS's SNMP stack not use this DLL? - Must
check.

I
certainly don't know the details -- maybe someone here does? 
-- but it's
gotta be a little difficult to send a random network packet to get a
desktop machine (that is, not a domain controller or an AD server or
something) and get it to invoke MSASN1.

I can imagine lots of attacks that require user intervention 
to hit this
one (like opening a hostile SSL-based web site) -- but can this be
triggered without user intervention?

thanks for more info -- tbird


Like the others, SNMP should never pass the perimeter defences, but we are
talking about the same internet that got hit by blaster, SQL-Slammer etc.
I'm still occasionally finding it difficult to get some admins to operate a
'default deny' stance on inbound ports, let alone outbound.


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