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RE: Peter Gutmann data deletion theaory?
From: "Earnhart, Benjamin J" <benjamin-earnhart () uiowa edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 17:45:21 -0500

I agree with most of what you say, and the general idea is valid.  However, the specifics of 

then a full reformat is quite enough to cause them to move on 
to the next
machine - they're not going to have the motivation or 
equipment to delve
into a randomly selected disk.

is a dangerously naïve approach.  With point-and-click easy to use freeware tools under windows, I can do almost 100% 
retrieval of files after a full reformat, and even after reloading the OS and using it for a while, the simple 
point-and-click freeware tools can retieve an awful lot of stuff.  And if I have the skills to use more powerful, 
complex tools, I can do even better, without needing a lot of money, time, or even strong motivation.

Even for a home user, I'd recommend using a program that securely deletes stuff by actively over-writing with multiple 
passes of random data (sdelete and DBAN are a couple of my favorites).  A format is *not* enough. Your general idea 
(that it depends on the motivation and resources available to the attacker) is good, just that your level of paranoia 
should maybe be turned up a notch :)

I'm not positive which Gutmann piece the OP was referring to, but if it's the one I'm thinking of, it's a bit dated -- 
his methods were briefly really popular as a shortcut to secure deletion, but if they're the ones I think he's 
referring to, then they don't work with more modern file systems, so simple random passes are better, though more 
costly to implement.    


-----Original Message-----
From: Jeremy Epstein [mailto:jeremy.epstein () webmethods com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2005 2:01 PM
To: Jared Johnson; focus-ms () securityfocus com
Cc: bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Peter Gutmann data deletion theaory?

Like anything in security, "it depends".  In particular, it 
depends on what
the assumed adversary motivations and capabilities are.  If 
the adversary is
a nation-state with electron microscopes and other expensive 
devices, and
the disk is believed to have held highly classified information, it's
clearly true that the only way to destroy the data is to burn 
the disk (and
in the right way).  If, on the other hand, the adversary is 
someone who's
randomly buying used computers in hopes of finding carelessly 
deleted files,
then a full reformat is quite enough to cause them to move on 
to the next
machine - they're not going to have the motivation or 
equipment to delve
into a randomly selected disk.

Where in between these two extremes it's necessary to burn 
the disk is an
exercise left to the reader ;-)  You really have to do a risk 
analysis... If
it's cheaper / easier / less dangerous for the adversary to 
dumpster dive to
get hardcopies or bribe someone or hack into the system, then 
destroying the
hardware is putting the effort in the wrong place.  For a lot 
of classified
systems, the assumption is that obtaining used disks is a low 
cost attack,
so it's cost effective to use destruction.

--Jeremy

-----Original Message-----
From: Jared Johnson [mailto:jaredsjazz () Yahoo com] 
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 7:49 PM
To: focus-ms () securityfocus com
Cc: bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: Peter Gutmann data deletion theaory?

All,

Do you all agree with Peter Gutman's conclusion on his theory 
that data can never really be erased, as noted in his quote below:

"Data overwritten once or twice may be recovered by 
subtracting what is expected to be read from a storage 
location from what is actually read. Data which is 
overwritten an arbitrarily large number of times can still be 
recovered provided that the new data isn't written to the 
same location as the original data (for magnetic media), or 
that the recovery attempt is carried out fairly soon after 
the new data was written (for RAM). For this reason it is 
effectively impossible to sanitise storage locations by 
simple overwriting them, no matter how many overwrite passes 
are made or what data patterns are written. However by using 
the relatively simple methods presented in this paper the 
task of an attacker can be made significantly more difficult, 
if not prohibitively expensive."

It seems that the perhaps the only real way to rid your Hard 
Drives of data is to burn them. 

I'd love to hear some thoughts on this from security and data 
experts out there.






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