Home page logo
/

bugtraq logo Bugtraq mailing list archives

[OpenPKG-SA-2006.037] OpenPKG Security Advisory (gnupg)
From: OpenPKG GmbH <openpkg-noreply () openpkg com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2006 23:22:34 +0100

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

____________________________________________________________________________

Publisher Name:          OpenPKG GmbH
Publisher Home:          http://openpkg.com/

Advisory Id (public):    OpenPKG-SA-2006.037
Advisory Type:           OpenPKG Security Advisory (SA)
Advisory Directory:      http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA
Advisory Document:       http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA-2006.037
Advisory Published:      2006-12-07 23:21 UTC

Issue Id (internal):     OpenPKG-SI-20061128.01
Issue First Created:     2006-11-28
Issue Last Modified:     2006-12-07
Issue Revision:          12
____________________________________________________________________________

Subject Name:            GnuPG
Subject Summary:         OpenPGP cryptography tool
Subject Home:            http://www.gnupg.org/
Subject Versions:        1.* <= 1.4.5 && 2.* <= 2.0.1

Vulnerability Id:        CVE-2006-6169, CVE-2006-6235
Vulnerability Scope:     global (not OpenPKG specific)

Attack Feasibility:      run-time
Attack Vector:           remote network
Attack Impact:           denial of service, arbitrary code execution

Description:
    Two security issues were discovered in the OpenPGP cryptography
    tool GnuPG [0], versions up to and including 1.4.5 and 2.0.1.
    
    The first issue [1] is a heap-based buffer overflow which has been
    identified by the vendor during fixing a bug reported by Hugh
    Warrington [2]. The problem is that the GnuPG internal function
    make_printable_string() is supposed to replace possible dangerous
    characters from a prompt and returns an allocated string. This
    string may be longer than the original one, but the buffer for the
    prompt is only be allocated at the size of the original string. The
    flaw might allow attackers to cause a denial of service or even
    execute arbitrary code via messages with "C-escape" expansions.
    
    The second issue [3] is a memory management problem. GnuPG uses
    data structures called filters to process OpenPGP messages. For
    communication between filters, context structures are used. These
    are usually allocated on the stack and passed to the filter
    functions. At most places the OpenPGP data stream fed into these
    filters is closed before the context structure gets deallocated.
    While decrypting encrypted packets, this may not happen in all
    cases and the filter may use a void context structure filled with
    garbage. An attacker may control this garbage. The filter context
    includes another context used by the low-level decryption to access
    the decryption algorithm. This is done using a function pointer.
    By carefully crafting an OpenPGP message, an attacker may control
    this function pointer and call an arbitrary function of the process.
    This is a remotely exploitable bug and affects any use of GnuPG
    where an attacker can control the data processed by GnuPG. It is
    not necessary limited to encrypted data, also signed data may be
    affected.

References:
    [0] http://www.gnupg.org/
    [1] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q4/000241.html
    [2] https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue728
    [3] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q4/000246.html
____________________________________________________________________________

Primary Package Name:    gnupg
Primary Package Home:    http://openpkg.org/go/package/gnupg

Corrected Distribution:  Corrected Series: Corrected Package:
OpenPKG Enterprise       E1.0-SOLID        gnupg-1.4.5-E1.0.1
OpenPKG Community        2-STABLE-20061018 gnupg-1.4.6-2.20061207
OpenPKG Community        2-STABLE          gnupg-1.4.6-2.20061207
OpenPKG Community        CURRENT           gnupg-1.4.6-20061206
OpenPKG Community        CURRENT           gnupg2-2.0.1-20061207
____________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this document was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key of the OpenPKG GmbH (public key id 61B7AE34)
which you can download from http://openpkg.com/openpkg.com.pgp
or retrieve from the OpenPGP keyserver at hkp://pgp.openpkg.org/.
Follow the instructions at http://openpkg.com/security/signatures/
for more details on how to verify the integrity of this document.
____________________________________________________________________________

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: OpenPKG GmbH <http://openpkg.com/>

iD8DBQFFeJP+ZwQuyWG3rjQRAqGRAKCv3mjhWlsMh/BDigHi05uaqwwvoQCfU3lV
brJFA0qntdpcwgqBYvQ28xQ=
=4wZZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


  By Date           By Thread  

Current thread:
  • [OpenPKG-SA-2006.037] OpenPKG Security Advisory (gnupg) OpenPKG GmbH (Dec 08)
[ Nmap | Sec Tools | Mailing Lists | Site News | About/Contact | Advertising | Privacy ]
AlienVault