mailing list archives
Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on Linux
From: Pavel Machek <pavel () ucw cz>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 22:38:42 +0100
On Tue 2009-10-27 21:19:19, Marco Verschuur wrote:
My buy.. :-( I persumed a re-use of the read-only FD, but that's not
I replayed it on a test-box and did some strace meanwhile and also
took a look
at the sourcecode of kernel/fs/proc.
It seems that the /proc filedescriptor is directly referring the
When creating this proc-entry the user guest did have access to the
file and the path via tmp,
therefore a successfull filedescriptor straight to the file inode is
being created, while checking
th entire path towards the file.
Although closing the path to the file, the actual file is made world
writable due to the file permissions being 666.
When guest does the "echo got you > /proc/self/fd/3" the /proc
filedescriptor (which directly refers the file inode)
is opened in O_WRONLY. So user guest is able to write the file.
IMHO; no bug or security issue, just a misunderstanding of the
Well, existing unix mechanisms would not allow writing to that
file. So yes, it works as authors intended, but I believe it is
misdesigned and security problem.
The /proc/self/fd/X appears to be a symlink, but it is not; it
operates on underlying objects directly. And IMNSHO it should honor
restrictions opened filedescriptors have, like append-only or
(Or alternatively, it could be fixed to behave like real symlinks. But
that would break /proc/*/fd/ on deleted files).
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html