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Re: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)
From: "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak () nexgo de>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2010 20:32:30 +0100

"Andrea Lee" <andrea () kattrap net> wrote:

I hope I'm not just feeding the troll...

No. You just made a complete fool of yourself.-P
Read the initial post again.
CAREFULLY.
Especially that part about unplugging from the network.

A local admin is an admin on one system. The domain admin is an admin
on all systems in the domain, including mission critical Windows
servers.

Correct so far.

With temporary domain admin privs,

What are "temporary domain admin privs"?
If you meant to say "cached credentials", just use "cached credentials".

the local admin could log into the AD

A local admin (or better: a local user account) CAN'T log into the AD.
Only domain user accounts can.

Cached credentials are stored for domain accounts only, and are only
used when the AD is NOT available during login. They are NEVER used to
login to another computer!

and change permissions / passwords for another user or
another user, thus getting full admin rights on all systems for a long
period of time. Plus whatever havoc might be caused by having the
ability to change rights on fileshares to allow the new domain admin
to see confidential files..

I would expect that the intent is to use another flaw for a normal
user to become a local admin, and then jump to domain admin via this.

You got wrong expectations. And: there is no "jump"!

So yes. In an enterprise environment, the "domain administrator" is "bigger".

GIGO!

Stefan

[ braindead fullquote removed ]


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