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Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure
From: "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak () nexgo de>
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 23:56:31 +0200

"Reindl Harald" <h.reindl () thelounge net> wrote:

Am 11.08.2013 22:15, schrieb Stefan Kanthak:
"Reindl Harald" <h.reindl () thelounge net> wrote:
Am 10.08.2013 16:52, schrieb Tobias Kreidl:
It is for this specific reason that utilities like suPHP can be used as a powerful tool to at least keep the
account user from shooting anyone but him/herself in the foot because of any configuration or broken security
issues. Allowing suexec to anyone but a seasoned, responsible admin is IMO a recipe for disaster.

and what makes you believe that a developer can not be a "seasoned, responsible admin"?

Because developers write functions like "system", "symlink" and "suexec"
which can create havoc (and are WELL-KNOWN for creating havoc since
years) and allow everybody to call them in the default configuration of
their software.

a so because some stupid developers all are faulty?

If you say so: OK.
Read again what I wrote, carefully!

bullshit, many of the "seasoned, responsible admins" which are only
admins are unable to really understand the implications of whatever
config they rollout

It was the developer who created and published this vulnerable software
or the vulnerable default configuration in the first place.

it was the admin who did not RTFM and rolled out default
settings in environents with untrustable code

JFTR: untrustable <> vulnerable!

Read again what I wrote, carefully.

If you'd have a clue you may have heard of concepts like "fail safe"
or "safe default configuration".
ANY software with an insecure default configuration is DEFECTIVE!

JFTR: why should gazillions of users/administrators fix the fault(s)
of a single/few developer(s)?

If a user/administrator who installs software has to turn insecure
features OFF its the developer who is to blame, and of course the
testers, the QA and the management too

not entirely untrue, but anybody who thinks he can install
whatever server-software with defaults, not RTFM and call
hiself a serious admin is a fool

Why not: I expect every developer to exercise all due diligence,
test the code, and ship it with a SECURE default configuration.
Software with an insecure default configuration is DEFECTIVE!

again:
symlinks are to not poision always and everywhere
they become where untrusted customer code is running
blame the admin which doe snot know his job and not
the language offering a lot of functions where some
can be misused

Again: symlinks are well-known as attack vector for years!

It's not the user/administrator who develops or ships insecure
code!

Stefan


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