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RE: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure
From: "Peter Gregory" <Peter.Gregory () tommybahama com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 11:56:07 -0700


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-----Original Message-----
From: Coderaptor [mailto:coderaptor () gmail com] 
Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 10:28 AM
To: Reindl Harald
Cc: Stefan Kanthak; Tobias Kreidl; bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation /
information disclosure

I have been a silent spectator to this drama, and could not resist
adding a few thoughts of my own:

1. All software, especially webservers, should ship with secure
defaults. Period. It is a fundamental mistake to assume all admins who
roll out web apps and maintain servers RTFM before rolling out. The key
idea here is "time to market", and there is huge amount of data to prove

2. Apache clearly does not ship with secure defaults in favor of
convenience? disable_functions is a  example - do you expect an admin to
be a unix expert or know what each parameter in there means? Also
indicates this was added in reactively, and not accounted for in the
core design. Why not enable_functions instead, with everything disabled
to begin with? (Oh, that wouldn't help you achieve world dominance and

3. Secure by design, implementation, and deployment isn't utopia, it's
very much an achievable target. But then it wouldn't feed bugtraq
anymore or the billion dollar industry called as "security industry"
would it?

Huge amount of software today is turd polishing, open source no
exception (though it is supposed to have better track record). The blame
lies squarely on everyone.


sent via 100% recycled electrons from my mobile command center.

On Aug 11, 2013, at 3:30 PM, Reindl Harald <h.reindl () thelounge net>

Am 11.08.2013 23:56, schrieb Stefan Kanthak:
"Reindl Harald" <h.reindl () thelounge net> wrote:
symlinks are to not poision always and everywhere they become where 
untrusted customer code is running blame the admin which doe snot 
know his job and not the language offering a lot of functions where 
some can be misused

Again: symlinks are well-known as attack vector for years!

and that's why any admin which is not clueless disables the symlink 
function - but there exists code which *is* secure, runs in a 
crontrolled environment and make use of it for good reasons

It's not the user/administrator who develops or ships insecure code!

but it's the administrator which has the wrong job if create symlinks 
is possible from any random script running on his servers

anyways, i am done with this thread

the topic is *not* "Apache suEXEC privilege elevation" it is "admins 
not secure their servers" - period

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