Dailydave: Blah blah Warfare Blah.

[Dave Aitel <dave () immunitysec com>]

http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_2_03_04.htm
http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Fourth-generation_warfare
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c438.htm\
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR789/MR789.ch4.pdf

On War #53

Fifth Generation Warfare?

2/03/04
By William S. Lind

Despite the fact that the framework of the Four Generations of Modern 
War is relatively new, first appearing in print in 1989, some observers 
are now talking about a Fifth Generation. Some see the Fifth Generation 
as a product of new technologies, such as nanotechnology. Others define 
it as the state’s struggle to maintain its monopoly on war and social 
organization in the face of Fourth Generation challengers. One 
correspondent defined it as terrorist acts done by one group in such a 
manner that they are blamed on another, something traditionally known as 
“pseudo-operations.”
These ideas are all valuable, and if people try to think beyond or 
outside the framework of the Four Generations, that is probably a good 
thing. An intellectual framework must remain open or it descends into an 
ideology, something poisonous per se (as Russell Kirk wrote, 
conservatism is the negation of ideology). At the same time, I have to 
say that these attempts to announce a Fifth Generation seem to go a 
generation too far.
One reason for the confusion may be a misapprehension of what 
“generation” means. In the context of the Four Generations of Modern 
War, “generation” is shorthand for a dialectically qualitative shift. As 
the originator of the framework, I adopted the word “generation” because 
I was speaking to and writing for Marines, and “dialectically 
qualitative shift” has more syllables than the Marine mind can readily 
grasp (think of the Emperor Joseph II’s response when he first heard 
Mozart’s music: “Too many notes.”). Most Marines vaguely remember that 
Hegel pitched for the Yankees in the late 1940’s.
As that old German would be quick to tell us, dialectically qualitative 
shifts occur very seldom. In my view, there were only three in the field 
of warfare since the modern era began with the Peace of Westphalia; the 
Fourth marks the end of the modern period.
One simple test for whether or not something constitutes a generational 
shift is that, absent a vast disparity in size, an army from a previous 
generation cannot beat a force from the new generation. The Second 
Generation French Army of 1940 could not defeat the Third Generation 
Wehrmacht, even thought the French had more tanks and better tanks than 
the Germans. The reason I do not think the wars of the French Revolution 
and Napoleon mark a generational shift is that Wellington consistently 
beat the French, and the British Army he led remained very much an 18th 
century army.
While attempts to think beyond the Four Generations should generally be 
welcomed, there are some shoals to avoid. One is technological 
determinism, the false notion that war’s outcome is usually determined 
by superiority in equipment. Martin van Creveld’s book /Technology and 
War/ makes a strong case that technology is seldom the determining factor.
A related danger is technological hucksterism: coming up with Madison 
Avenue slogans to sell new weapons programs by claiming that they 
fundamentally change warfare. This kind of carnival sideshow act lies at 
the heart of the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs,” and it 
dominates all discussions of national defense in Washington. Every 
contractor who hopes to get his snout in the trough claims that his 
widget “revolutionizes” war. As the framework of the Four Generations 
spreads, you can be sure that the Merchants of Death will claim that 
whatever they are trying to sell is an absolute necessity for Fourth (or 
Fifth) Generation war. It will all be poppycock.
From what I have seen thus far, honest attempts to discover a Fifth 
Generation suggest that their authors have not fully grasped the vast 
change embodied in the Fourth Generation. The loss of the state’s 
monopoly, not only on war but also on social organization and first 
loyalties, alters everything. We are only in the earliest stages of 
trying to understand what the Fourth Generation means in full and how it 
will alter – or, in too many cases, end – our lives.
Attempting to visualize a Fifth Generation from where we are now is like 
trying to see the outlines of the Middle Ages from the vantage point of 
the late Roman Empire. There is no telescope that can reach so far. We 
can see the barbarians on the march. In America and in Europe, we 
already find them inside the limes and within the legions. But what 
follows the chaos they bring in their wake, only the gods on Mount 
Olympus can see. It may be worth remembering that the last time this 
happened, the gods themselves died.
William S. Lind is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism
Free Congress Foundation


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