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RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
From: Jordan K Wiens <jwiens () nersp nerdc ufl edu>
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2003 15:12:36 -0500 (EST)
The point seems to be that it's possible to be eblow-deep in someones
networks with relatively 'normal' traffic the IDS won't pick up. A
specifically designed web-crawler can sneak right under the radar of a
typical IDS, yet it would easily be detected by a honeytoken. Slowly
enumerating all users from a public LDAP directory probably won't be
detected by the IDS, but a honeytoken would snag it.
UF Network Incident Response Team
On Fri, 21 Feb 2003, Rob Shein wrote:
Interesting notion, but with a few problems. My idea of a honeypot was an
untrusted machine that draws fire, so to say, from an attacker. In doing
so, it serves the dual roles of concentrating the attacking traffic onto a
segment that is far more homogenous (in terms of activity) and therefore
easier to monitor, and causing the attacker to focus on a system that will
not give him access to anything of any importance. Putting "honey
documents" or other data (like database entries or LDAP objects) in the
midst of valid data will not draw attention away, and even if they did,
detection of them wouldn't get you anything new. If your IDS sees the
content that it is to look for in these documents, why wouldn't it have seen
any of the attacking traffic to begin with? And either way, the bad guy is
already elbows-deep in your goodies at that point.
From: Augusto Paes de Barros [mailto:augusto () paesdebarros com br]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 6:18 AM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting views. Why
use only honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when whe can use
accounts, documents, info, etc? I was developing an idea that
I call "honeytokens", to use on Windows networks. Basically,
information that shouldn't be flowing over the network and,
if you can detect it, something wrong is happening.
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP
augusto () paesdebarros com br
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RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots Augusto Paes de Barros (Feb 21)