mailing list archives
RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
From: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2003 15:45:57 -0500
Yeah, but if you have more than one LDAP server, and replication, you'll
also snag other valid traffic that happens to control the objects in LDAP.
From: Jordan K Wiens [mailto:jwiens () nersp nerdc ufl edu]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 3:13 PM
To: Rob Shein
Cc: 'Augusto Paes de Barros'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
The point seems to be that it's possible to be eblow-deep in
someones networks with relatively 'normal' traffic the IDS
won't pick up. A specifically designed web-crawler can sneak
right under the radar of a typical IDS, yet it would easily
be detected by a honeytoken. Slowly enumerating all users
from a public LDAP directory probably won't be detected by
the IDS, but a honeytoken would snag it.
UF Network Incident Response Team
On Fri, 21 Feb 2003, Rob Shein wrote:
Interesting notion, but with a few problems. My idea of a honeypot
was an untrusted machine that draws fire, so to say, from
In doing so, it serves the dual roles of concentrating the
traffic onto a segment that is far more homogenous (in terms of
activity) and therefore easier to monitor, and causing the
focus on a system that will not give him access to anything of any
importance. Putting "honey documents" or other data (like database
entries or LDAP objects) in the midst of valid data will not draw
attention away, and even if they did, detection of them
you anything new. If your IDS sees the content that it is
to look for
in these documents, why wouldn't it have seen any of the attacking
traffic to begin with? And either way, the bad guy is already
elbows-deep in your goodies at that point.
From: Augusto Paes de Barros [mailto:augusto () paesdebarros com br]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 6:18 AM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting views. Why use
only honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when whe can use accounts,
documents, info, etc? I was developing an idea that I call
"honeytokens", to use on Windows networks. Basically, information
that shouldn't be flowing over the network and, if you can detect
it, something wrong is happening.
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP http://www.paesdebarros.com.br
augusto () paesdebarros com br
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RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots Augusto Paes de Barros (Feb 21)