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RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots
From: "Augusto Paes de Barros" <augusto () paesdebarros com br>
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2003 18:56:26 -0300

True! But you can configure the rule on the IDS to catch the honeytoken
on all traffic BUT the traffic between the servers.

[]s
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP
www.paesdebarros.com.br
 

-----Mensagem original-----
De: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net] 
Enviada em: sexta-feira, 21 de fevereiro de 2003 17:46
Para: 'Jordan K Wiens'
Cc: 'Augusto Paes de Barros'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Assunto: RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


Yeah, but if you have more than one LDAP server, and replication, you'll
also snag other valid traffic that happens to control the objects in
LDAP.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jordan K Wiens [mailto:jwiens () nersp nerdc ufl edu]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 3:13 PM
To: Rob Shein
Cc: 'Augusto Paes de Barros'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


The point seems to be that it's possible to be eblow-deep in
someones networks with relatively 'normal' traffic the IDS 
won't pick up.  A specifically designed web-crawler can sneak 
right under the radar of a typical IDS, yet it would easily 
be detected by a honeytoken.  Slowly enumerating all users 
from a public LDAP directory probably won't be detected by 
the IDS, but a honeytoken would snag it.

--
Jordan Wiens
UF Network Incident Response Team
(352)392-2061

On Fri, 21 Feb 2003, Rob Shein wrote:

Interesting notion, but with a few problems.  My idea of a honeypot
was an untrusted machine that draws fire, so to say, from 
an attacker.
In doing so, it serves the dual roles of concentrating the
attacking
traffic onto a segment that is far more homogenous (in terms of
activity) and therefore easier to monitor, and causing the 
attacker to
focus on a system that will not give him access to anything of any
importance.  Putting "honey documents" or other data (like database 
entries or LDAP objects) in the midst of valid data will not draw 
attention away, and even if they did, detection of them 
wouldn't get
you anything new.  If your IDS sees the content that it is
to look for
in these documents, why wouldn't it have seen any of the attacking
traffic to begin with?  And either way, the bad guy is already 
elbows-deep in your goodies at that point.

-----Original Message-----
From: Augusto Paes de Barros [mailto:augusto () paesdebarros com br]
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 6:18 AM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots


Lance's point can be expanded in very interesting views. Why use
only honeypots "hosts" or "nets", when whe can use accounts, 
documents, info, etc? I was developing an idea that I call 
"honeytokens", to use on Windows networks. Basically, information 
that shouldn't be flowing over the network and, if you can detect 
it, something wrong is happening.

--
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP http://www.paesdebarros.com.br 
augusto () paesdebarros com br




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