Disclaimer: I work for a security vendor that has integrated VM & IPS
into a single security appliance.
Hi Peter & Andrew,
It is surprisingly hard to discuss these type of ideas without sounding
like an advertisement, but I will try.
I think the question of balance between VM vs. IPS is a good one.
However, it assumes that a choice needs to be made between one
technology and another, and I don't think that is necessarily the
case... A third alternative is integrating the two technologies to
solve shortcomings in both.
The biggest knock I've heard about VM is that it doesn't actually
"protect" anything since it is not patching vulnerablities. Yes a VM
solution provides greater visibility and more information to make
intelligent decisions on, but it protects indirectly, not directly. IPS
on the other hand protects directly, but has the reputation of requiring
a great deal of care and feeding as noted by Andrew. In addition, most
companies are reluctant to place IPS solutions inline as they fear
interruption of legitimate business traffic. A recent survey I read
stated that less than 50% of IPS solutions are actually placed inline!
The root cause of these fears re: IPSes are related to the
administrator's lack of visibility within the network so that the
correct choices can be made in when tuning an IPS product.
We have found that integrating VM & IPS together can solve many of the
pain points associated with IPS and brings VM into the fold as part of a
"direct" protection solution: Specifically it can help prevent an IPS
from stopping legitimate traffic, provide visibility within the network
for the administrator, and make maintaining IPS more efficient. The
idea is pretty straight forward. A VM/IPS identifies the assets on the
network through some discovery process. It then profiles the assets
being protected in order to gather the necessary information, so that it
can determine which rules should be applied to any given asset.
Obviously, there is a lot that goes into the identification, profiling
and correlation, but that is another discussion. In this scenario, the
VM is serving as a feedback mechanism which provides decision making
information to the IPS. Without this feedback mechanism, an IPS is
blind and requires a lot of care and feeding.
The bottom line is that a system that integrates VM & IPS together is
much more scalable and reliable than a traditional IPS solution that
does not since IPSes require continual, ongoing tuning because networks
are continually changing either from within, or due to outside
influences such as vulnerabilities.
Why is a VM/IPS solution more scalable? Because the VM/IPS is smart
enough to handle the time consuming rote tasks of information gathering
and tuning for the administrator.
Why is a VM/IPS solution more reliable? Because it can help prevent
false +s and prevent the interruption of legitimate traffic due to lack
of tuning. Also, information is less accurate the further you are from
the original source. This applies not only to "where did you get your
information from?", but also "when did you get it?". As such, a VM/IPS
that frequently gathers information from the original source is going to
have more accurate information than an administrator that has to hunt
down the required data.
So what I am saying is that an VM/IPS (VPS?) knows when a system comes
online, or a new vulnerability is discovered and can keep pace with
changes made within the network. Now, the administrator's role is one
of managing the process of remediation based upon information provided
by the VM and reviewing/validating/adjusting action taken by the IPS.
I know that was a long winded response. As I said above, it is
surprisingly hard to discuss these type of ideas without sounding like
an advertisement! Hopefully I wasn't too ad-like.
All the best,
-Vik
--
Vikram Phatak
CTO, Lucid Security
http://www.lucidsecurity.com
Peter Schawacker wrote:
>Hiya Andrew,
>
>I always enjoy reading your posts. Thanks for replying to mine. I've
>answered some of your comments inline below.
>
>I would be remiss if I were not to warn readers that (here comes the
>"full-disclosure" statement...) I used to pimp IPS and VM for a certain
>company and that I now pimp VM, SIM and related technologies for a different
>one.
>
>This is a really important conversation, the IPS/VM balance problem. Let's
>keep it going. Having worked with both, I for one would like to get more
>thoughts about the relationship between IPS and VM out on the table.
>
>Cheers,
>
>P
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Andrew Plato [mailto:andrew.plato_at_anitian.com]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2005 9:12 AM
>To: ps_at_tenablesecurity.com; focus-ids_at_securityfocus.com
>Subject: RE: IDS\IPS that can handle one Gig
>
>
>
>
>>Another option, and one that many organizations are beginning to
>>
>>
>favor,
>
>
>>is to forget the current, "fashionable" notions of IPS and return
>>to basics -- to focus more closely on vunerability and information
>>management. I believe that if you have a comprehensive, continuous
>>and meaningful flow of information about the environment and an
>>effective vulnerability remediation program, the need for IPS
>>appliances and agents (band-aids) can be reduced dramatically.
>>
>>
>
>I hear this every now and then from security people, and I think this is
>an attitude borne out of lack of experience with IPS.
>
>PES>> Actually, it is an attitude borne out of entirely too much experience
>with IPS. (I won't go into detail on my experience, but you can google for
>me if you'd like.)
>
>I have yet to see an environment (and I am a consultant so I see
>hundreds per year) where there is an effective patch and vulnerability
>management that can keep pace with the exploits in the wild. Quite
>simply, it is impossible to think you can keep a large enterprise
>continuously patched and therefore resistant to the latest
>vulnerabilities.
>
>PES>> I have seen a few environments that have deployed patch and
>configuration management systems that are effective. I can't mention any by
>name, but they're amongst the top 100 of the Fortune500. Granted, they are
>the exception.
>
>On average, it can take 20 to 30 days for an organization to roll out a
>single Microsoft Windows patch. That includes testing, troubleshooting,
>and deployment. In 30 days, your environment could be crawling with all
>sorts of filth thanks to unpatched machines.
>
>PES>> Yes, on _average_ companies struggle mightily with patch roll-outs.
>But not all companies take 20-30 days. My point is that patch management
>can be done. Frankly, most IPS roll-outs fail also and for much the same
>reasons as patch/config management. IPS rules require testing, although
>folks tend not to do bother, just as most don't bother testing patches and
>other changes. Let's also bear in mind that most shops don't test patches
>before deployment -- at least in any sort of formal way.
>
>PES>> The point of my last post, just to refine it a bit, is that the better
>your Vulnerability Management (including patch and configuration management)
>the less you need IPS. I suppose the converse is also true. I would
>qualify my point by saying that VM and IPS are far from perfect, which is
>why we ("we" being InfoSec practitioners) are constantly faced with weighing
>trade-offs between them.
>
>Furthermore, if you look at the timeline of when an vulnerability is
>"discovered", then when an exploit hits the streets - that time can be
>days, even hours. In that case, its still weeks before MS or anybody
>releases a patch, and then even more time before you could patch all
>your machines. In this case, even under reasonable, well controlled
>situation most organizations are three to six weeks out from patching
>systems when an exploit is released. That is a ridiculously long period
>of time. A period where that environment could become infested.
>
>PES>> Yep, the zero-day threat is real, but it's not the whole problem.
>NIPS is but one arrow in the quiver and it has its own virtues and defects.
>
>Furthermore, a "comprehensive, continuous and meaningful flow of
>information about the environment" means eyeballs. Somebody needs to be
>watching that meaningful flow of information. And while highly trained
>security engineers are an important part of a security team - they won't
>work 24 hours day. People are the most important part of information
>security, but technology works longer hours.
>
>PES>> Indeed, most security information management and VM systems are
>useless and expensive -- but not all... (I'll spare you the commercial.)
>
>People also make mistakes and miss things. Its insane to think a
>security admin or a network admin has the time or concentration to sift
>through mountains of data everyday. Nobody will do that job for long -
>or do it well.
>
>PES>> I couldn't agree more. Fortunately, there are ways to automate the
>sifting process.
>
>Now, with a good IPS deployment, I can load up a signature update
>(hopefully released BEFORE the exploit hit the streets), and now my
>entire network is secure from the new exploit. I go home and rest easy.
>If I have host-IPS I can update all my workstations too. Now, my patch
>management team has time to roll-out patches in a more controlled and
>logical manner. They are not dashing around at 4AM trying to put out
>fires.
>
>PES>> Agreed. We're talking about a healthy, well-balanced IPS/VM
>lifestyle.
>
>IPS gives people control over their environment. And well-run IT
>departments have control over their equipment. They're not constantly
>flailing around or giving themselves impossible tasks.
>
>PES>> I think you're overselling IPS here, but I've sold IPS too, so I get
>where you're coming from. The gist of what you're saying is largely true.
>
>That much said, I agree that IPS is sometimes given unrealistic
>expectations. For this, I point the finger squarely at the legions of
>Blackberry pecking vendor reps and cell phone yacking volume resellers
>who say things like "If you're not using <insert technology here>,
>you're not secure!" (that's an actual line, from an actual ad I saw).
>These people could care less about security, they just want to sell
>something. So, they'll tell you anything you want to hear about an IPS.
>And they rely on the ignorance of IT departments to fall for marketing
>BS.
>
>However, when you peel away the sales people, I sincerely do not think
>IPS is some "fashionable notion." It's a serious and effective way to
>proactively defend a network. I've have seen the benefits.
>
>PES>> Don't cast aspersions on "fashionable notions"! :-) Just because an
>idea is overblown doesn't mean it's entirely bad. These days it's just not
>possible to sell any nascent technology, no matter how good it is, without
>declaring it a panacea. It's just the nature of the InfoSec Marketing Beast
>to which we are all in some way victims.
>
>...
>
>
>
>___________________________________
>Andrew Plato, CISSP
>President/Principal Consultant
>ANITIAN ENTERPRISE SECURITY
>
>3800 SW Cedar Hills Blvd, Suite 280
>Beaverton, OR 97005
>503-644-5656 Office
>503-214-8069 Fax
>503-201-0821 Mobile
>www.anitian.com
>___________________________________
>
>GPG fingerprint: 16E6 C5B0 B6CB F287 776E E9A9 AF47 9914 3582 633D
>GPG public key available at: http://www.anitian.com/corp/keys.htm
>
>
>
>
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Received on Jun 06 2005
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