Full Disclosure: tripbid secure codes

[<auto94042 () hushmail com>]

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holos,

i come to tell a very grave thing that make me many a stress . . .

i post the thing to the vuln dev some days ago and get quite a big respnose.
not only do i get a heart 2 heat with n1xo reiman about portmon ! but
some folks want me to look at the code they make, specially a 'hello-
world.c' progie -> " holo, can you check my hello-world.c for strcpy
?? securecode do the trick " <- paraphase the msg, i rm -rf / it since
it make me anger and stress it !

i am willing to try the secure code since the grep 'strcpy' is losing
his thrills so i trick around with :
[user () localhost]$ ./securecode -s hello-world.c

File to open: hello-world.c

Please wait...


The scan has finished!

i see that the hello world is safe from strcpy over flow so not a worry
and then i eat some snack. behold ! some monkey buisness when i came
back-
[user () localhost]$ ls
bala_clava_has_you/  hello-world.c  r00t_is_next_pylon/  securecode*
 tmp/  YOU_ARE_SUCH_A_FUCKING_MOMO/
/* some stuff got snippity , for levity of full discloshure(i read the
chatter by len!*/

i do not mkdir these thing !! who can it be clowning around? ?

i attach the hello_world and zipper it to protect the readers you can
unzipper it(tar -zxvf) but you may be hack if your not careful and try
secure code -s to it .  maybe some one can tell me what happen or help
me figure it what next to do ? ? i think this machnie is not a trusted
one :
[user () localhost]$ uname -a
Linux localhost 2.4.21-0.13mdk #1 Fri Mar 14 15:08:06 EST 2003 i686 unknown
unknown GNU/Linux

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