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[OpenPKG-SA-2004.055] OpenPKG Security Advisory (gettext)
From: OpenPKG <openpkg () openpkg org>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 15:37:48 +0100

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security () openpkg org                         openpkg () openpkg org
OpenPKG-SA-2004.055                                          23-Dec-2004
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             gettext
Vulnerability:       insecure temporary file generation
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:         Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= gettext-0.14.1-20041006 >= gettext-0.14.1-20041217
OpenPKG 2.2          <= gettext-0.14.1-2.2.0    >= gettext-0.14.1-2.2.1
OpenPKG 2.1          <= gettext-0.14.1-2.1.0    >= gettext-0.14.1-2.1.1

Affected Releases:   Dependent Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      aegis, apache, doodle, giftoxic, gimp, glib2, gpa,
                     gqview, gtk2, heartbeat, indent, kcd, kde-base,
                     kde-libs, kolab, libextractor, lyx, openjade,
                     orbit, papyrus, perl-locale, php, php5, popt,
                     smbc, subversion, xine-lib, xine-ui, yodl
OpenPKG 2.2          aegis, apache, giftoxic, gimp, glib2, gqview,
                     gtk2, indent, kolab, openjade, orbit, perl-locale,
                     php, popt, yodl
OpenPKG 2.1          aegis, apache, gimp, glib2, gqview, gtk2, indent,
                     kolab, openjade, orbit, perl-locale, php, popt, yodl

Description:
  Trustix security engineers discovered vulnerabilities [0] in the
  "autopoint" and "gettextize" scripts of GNU gettext [1]. The scripts
  in question insecurely generate temporary files which could allow
  a malicious user to overwrite another user's files via a "symlink
  attack". Software only using GNU gettext's headers and libraries is
  not affected by this problem, however. The Common Vulnerabilities and
  Exposures (CVE) project assigned the identifier CAN-2004-0966 [2] to
  the problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
  rpm -q gettext". If you have the "gettext" package installed and its
  version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
  upgrade it (see Solution) and its dependent packages (see above) [3][4].

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
  from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [4]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD
  ftp> get gettext-0.14.1-2.2.1.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig gettext-0.14.1-2.2.1.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild gettext-0.14.1-2.2.1.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/gettext-0.14.1-2.2.1.*.rpm

  Additionally, we recommend rebuilding and reinstalling all dependent
  packages (see above) as well [3][4].
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://www.trustix.org/errata/2004/0050
  [1] http://www.gnu.org/software/gettext/
  [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0966
  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/gettext-0.14.1-2.2.1.src.rpm
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/gettext-0.14.1-2.1.1.src.rpm
  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
  [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/
  [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg () openpkg org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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