mailing list archives
Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and ResponseGuidelines
From: ET LoWNOISE <et () cyberspace org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2004 22:56:35 -0400 (EDT)
Instead of publishing personal opinions over the OIS, its better to
focus on the Guideline again. The Process is based entirely on the vendor
but not on the customers, going against the "efforts to safeguard
customers". Even the participants group doesnt include them as
active part of the process.
Its so vendor oriented that doesnt address the case where they
find security vulnerabilities on their own products. It should be the
same process, but in this case the vendor is the finder. In reality many
companies doesnt disclosure their own vulnerabilities (and dont create
a fix, just release the next "new" version, leaving the customers
The process assumes that nobody knows about the vulnerability
discovered by the "finder". If someone discovers a vulnerabiluity theres
a big chance that someone else has allready discover it in the past and
that has been actively exploited.
In the end the vendor will protect his comercial interest instead of
protecting the customers. And becouse is the owner of the process it can
delay, or stop the process at any phase without producing any results
(fix, advisory etc).
Efrain 'ET' Torres
[LoWNOISE] Colombia 2004
et () cyberspace org
On Sun, 4 Jul 2004, Fred Mobach wrote:
The Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) extends an invitation to
the readers of the BugTraq, NTBugtraq, and Full-Disclosure mailing
lists to participate in the ongoing public review of the OIS Security
Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines.
I have problems with the OIS guidelines as I distrust at least one
member of OIS since it won't publish verifiable information on Bugtraq
since some years. When I combine the policy of that company with the
next statement from OIS's about.html page
"Does OIS support pre-disclosure of vulnerability information to select
No. We believe the software author should be given a chance to create a
fix before vulnerability information is made public, but that there
should be no further distribution of that information until the fix is
complete. This priniciple can be very difficult to adhere to in certain
situations, such as dealing with the open source community where there
aren't protections to keep vulnerability information secret."
I am afraid that that company might take years to supply a fix or even
to never supply that. A limit of at most four weeks before disclosure
seems reasonable to me. If that company cannot live with that it can opt
Another interesting point for me is the statement about the open source
community in the same paragraph. Some organizations still have problems
with that community, which is reflected by adopters.html webpage of OIS.
No representation of the open source community as far as I can see. But
please correct me if I am wrong.
Fred Mobach - fred () mobach nl - postmaster () mobach nl
Systemhouse Mobach bv - The Netherlands - since 1976
website : http://fred.mobach.nl
Q: servos ad pileum vocare ?
A: servos fenestrae ad pileum rubrem vocare !
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.