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RE: Fw: Citibank reminder: please update your data
From: "DSardina" <dsardina () si rr com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2004 11:19:57 -0400

Frederic, I couldn't of said it better myself.

Attached is the screenshot of the email and the emails html source code.





 

 
There is also another one going around acting as Microsoft Update, telling
the user to click on a link to update to SP2.
 
 
<http://www.dslreports.com/r0/download/687798~6d674802d815a8f9963e8c90f72615
28/untitled.PNG> 


DS-

 
 




-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com
[mailto:full-disclosure-admin () lists netsys com] On Behalf Of Frederic
Charpentier
Sent: Friday, October 08, 2004 9:48 AM
Cc: full-disclosure () lists netsys com
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fw: Citibank reminder: please update your
data


About Citibank Scam :
it's an phising attack based on GDI+ JPEG overflow.

The exploit JPEG is named Ducky.jpg, and is detected by some antivirus
systems as Trojan.Ducky.

The message from CityBank is not textual, but an imagemap of an image
that is made to look like text.
The image is called sushi.gif, and it is believed to be used in attempt
to evade anti-spam systems that
are based purely on textual analysis. When the recipient clicks on the
link within the imagemap, they are
redirected to 67.43.211.1871:87/cit/index.htm.

Upon clicking on the imagemap, the user is taken to a site to enter
confidential information. The interesting part of this image entry
dialog box is that it also opens a legitimate copy of the Citibank Web site
under the phishing dialog to further enhance its perceived
legitimacy. The Window in the foreground is malicious and posts to
verify.php on 67.182.134.119, while the window in the background is the
legitimate homepage of Citibank.

The result of a successful compromise is the downloading and execution
of ll.exe from maybeyes.biz. ll.exe is then saved to c:\y.exe and executed.
Upon execution, y.exe calls URLDownloadToFile() on
http://www.maybeyes.biz/upd.exe.
This file is then saved as %SYSTEMROOT%\divxencoder.exe. When executed,
divxencoder.exe will parse the system for the explorer.exe process for
the purpose of injecting a DLL into its memory space.

When run, the DLL contacts 65.75.185.210 on ports 9348 and 9323 to
download the XML configuration file that will be used as the basis for
the phishing spam.

Frederic Charpentier

Pablo wrote:

This hit me today.
The URL is:
http://%32%31%31%2E%39%37%2E%32%34%38%2E%36%30:%38%37/%63%69%74/%69%6E
%64%65%78%2E%68%74%6D

( http://211.97.248.60:87/cit/confirm.htm )



----- Original Message -----
From: "CITI" <supprefnum2 () citibank com>
To: <paa-listas () argentina com>
Sent: Thursday, October 07, 2004 9:08 PM
Subject: Citibank reminder: please update your data




in 1965 Surfing Love Stories in 1905 a When you in 1920 Vacation

Entertainment Everything please Andrea Thompson ANALYSIS NYTimes It's
impossible no doubt Nintendo Have a good time So, if we.. Coyote Ugly
that's a call for you Father's Day in 1955 Terra in 1850 X Men What
area, please?


---------------------------------------------------------------------
---


--
_______________________________________
Frederic Charpentier - Xmco Partners
Security Consulting / Pentest
web  : http://www.xmcopartners.com

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html



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