XSS vulnerabilities in Google.com

//=====================>> Security Advisory <<=====================//

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XSS vulnerabilities in Google.com

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--[ Author: Yair Amit , Watchfire Corporation http://www.watchfire.com

--[ Discovery Date: 15/11/2005

--[ Initial Vendor Response: 15/11/2005

--[ Issue solved: 01/12/2005

--[ Website: www.google.com

--[ Severity: High

--[ Summary

Two XSS vulnerabilities were identified in the Google.com website,

which allow an attacker to impersonate legitimate members of Google's

services or to mount a phishing attack.

Although Google uses common XSS countermeasures, a successful attack

is possible, when using UTF-7 encoded payloads.

--[ Background

Google's URL redirection script

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The script (http://www.google.com/url?q=...) is normally used for

redirecting the browser from Google's website to other sites.

For example, the following request will redirect the browser

to http://www.watchfire.com :

      - http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.watchfire.com

When the parameter (q) is passed to the script with illegal format

(The format seems to be: http://domain), a "403 Forbidden" page

returns to the user, informing that the query was illegal.

The parameter's value appears in the html returned to the user.

If http://www.google.com/url?q=USER_INPUT is requested, the text in

the "403 Forbidden" response would be:

      - "Your client does not have permission to get URL

      /url?q=USER_INPUT from this server."

The server response lacks charset encoding enforcement, such as:

* Response headers: "Content-Type: text/html; charset=[encoding]".

* Response body: "<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" (...)
charset=[encoding]/>".

Google's 404 NOT FOUND mechanism

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When requesting a page which doesn't exist under www.google.com, a

404 NOT FOUND response is returned to the user, with the original

path requested.

If http://www.google.com/NOTFOUND is requested, the following text

appears in the response:

"Not Found

The requested URL /NOTFOUND was not found on this server."

The server response lacks charset encoding enforcement, such as:

* Response headers: "Content-Type: text/html; charset=[encoding]".

* Response body: "<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" (...)
charset=[encoding]/>".

--[ XSS vulnerabilities

While the aforementioned mechanisms (URL redirection script,

404 NOT FOUND) escape common characters used for XSS, such as <>

(triangular parenthesis) and apostrophes, it fails to handle

hazardous UTF-7 encoded payloads.

Therefore, when sending an XSS attack payload, encoded in UTF-7, the

payload will return in the response without being altered.

For the attack to succeed (script execution), the victims browser

should treat the XSS payload as UTF-7.

--[ IE charset encoding Auto-Selection

If 'Encoding' is set to 'Auto-Select', and Internet-Explorer finds a

UTF-7 string in the first 4096 characters of the response's body,

it will set the charset encoding to UTF-7 automatically, unless a

certain charset encoding is already enforced.

This automatic encoding selection feature makes it possible to mount

UTF-7 XSS attacks on Google.com.

--[ Solution

Google solved the aforementioned issues at 01/12/2005, by using

character encoding enforcement.

--[ Acknowledgement

The author would like to commend the Google Security Team for their

cooperation and communication regarding this vulnerability.

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