Home page logo
/

fulldisclosure logo Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Multiple AV Vendors ignoring tar.gz archives
From: James Eaton-Lee <james.mailing () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2005 01:19:00 +0000

In the majority of businesses, firewalling and virus protection are done
at the border of the network for a reason; when you eliminate as many
viruses and malicious network traffic in one place at the edge of your
network first, you effectively segregate 'good' and 'bad' information,
and provide business accountability into the bargain. 

It is for precisely this reason that 99% of businesses have some sort of
firewall (even if it's only a NAT gateway) on the *EDGE* of their
network, at the internet point of presence, rather than having client
firewall software installed on every client PC. Although you'd be
hard-pressed to find a business without client antivirus software on
every machine (if only for the simple reason that you can't protect
floppy disks with a firewall), you can get away with not scanning
e-mails on a client machine. 

Add to this the simple fact that it is difficult to manage and account
for client anti-virus software - client machines are to an extent
unmanaged and an 'unknown quantity' whereas servers can be *very*
tightly locked down, assuring a far higher degree of reliability from
server-based virus-scanning tools, firewalling, and intrusion detection
than client machines which are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks and
problems. Server anti-virus software starts to become more and more
attractive at this point..

..add to this the behaviour of different e-mail clients; especially in
environments which are not based on a single platform, there can be many
e-mail clients run in a business, and not all of them will interact with
anti-virus software in the same way. Linux clients may not be running
antivirus software at all, and yet in the case of .tar.gz and .tar.bz2
archives, are most likely to be exposed to marginally more 'exotic'
antivirus formats. 

Bearing all of these factors in mind, and also factoring the growing
reliability of SMEs on third-party and centralised antivirus scanning
for their mail (from external service providers via MX routing, and via
e-mail servers which aren't exchange which incorporate antivirus
scanning simply by calling the antivirus software on the server itself),
and gateway scanning becomes more and more significant; possibly more so
than desktop software for mail - mail being the most common form of
virus transmission - so significant that this *is*, in fact, a serious
problem.

I also disagree with you that it's a non sequitur to say that anti-virus
writers would be slow to react to viruses transmitted inside archives
they could not scan; all that an antivirus package is - essentially - is
a daemon doing pattern matching on all data coming into and out of
machines; anti-virus definitions (patterns) are very easy to write and
require little work to push to customers of anti-virus writers; archive
scanning, however, is a *functional* difference in the way in which
antivirus software works, which carries numerous implications; updating
an antivirus scanner's scanning engine is quite different to updating
the definitions. 

Add to this the fact that implementing archive support in an antivirus
package isn't as simple as it might seem; although bz2 is released under
a BSD license, gzip isn't - it's GPL, and therefore any antivirus vendor
would have to write their gzip code totally from scratch. There could
certainly be enough of a curfuffle surrounding a virus using one of
these archive formats to cause a delay of a few hours or even days in
releasing updates for antivirus software which addressed the issue - and
as we all know, the major damage in any virus epidemic is done in a very
short space of time. 

To be honest, though, that isn't really the point. antivirus vendors
necessarily have to write antivirus definitions reactively - but there's
nothing other than sheer laziness which is preventing them from
*pro*actively incorporating support for these types of archives into
their software.

regards,

 - James.

On Sun, 2005-02-06 at 11:15 +1300, Nick FitzGerald wrote:
Barrie Dempster wrote:

By passing some archives through www.virustotal.com I discovered
that
some AV companies ignore tar.gz's and possibly other archive formats
that aren't very common on windows systems (but supported by the
common
archive tools). 

If virus writers start using these formats AV companies could be
slow to
react as in some cases they may have to write functionality into
their
products that doesn't currently exist (support for scanning inside
said
archives) this could delay signature updates.

That's a non sequitur.

If a virus was released that depended on, say tar.gz archives, and
some 
AV products did not have tar.gz unpacking capabilities, there would
be 
no hindrance to those companies releasing detection updates.
Afterall, 
what they detect are the unpacked contents of such archives, so 
detection of the actual malware is just as easily added and shipped 
regardless of whether the malware in question self-packs
in .RAR, .ZIP, 
.TAR.GZ or .ZOO format (or does not pack itself in any archive format 
at all...).

Worse however, is the implication that missing unpacking abilities
for 
some modestly common archive type is a terrible flaw in a scanner.

Well, OK -- in a gateway scanner it is likely to be a terrible flaw.  
Any vaguely competent gateway scanner should have basic knowledge of 
all archive formats and should have an option to quarantine all 
messages with archives in the formats it cannot unpack and inspect.  
Sadly, most gateway scanners are not designed this way.  It is the
job 
of a gateway scanner to not let anything "dangerous" in and if you 
cannot tell what something is, prudence says you keep it out, or at 
least set it aside for more expert inspection.

However, once something gets to the desktop, it is only very mildly 
inconvenient that a scanner does not know how to unpack, say, tar.gz 
archives.  The point of a desktop scanner is to stop as much as 
possible that has got to where it shouldn't be.  Known virus scanning 
is a far from perfect method for achieving this, but as the only 
intelligent method of achieving it has been entirely disregarded by 
users, AV and OS developers, scanning is pretty much what we are left 
with.  Anyway, as we are assuming that the malware in question can be 
detected already, let's look at the consequence of a desktop scanner 
not knowing anything about tar.gz packing and the arrival of a piece
of 
known malware in such an archive...

Let's assume that the user has a tar.gz handler and the user double-
clicks on the dodgy Email attachment in question (the attachment that 
the shoddy gateway Email scanner should have stopped, even if it 
couldn't scan inside tar.gz files because this is hardly a
just-minted 
compression format...).  What happens?  The on-access virus scanner 
says nothing as the tar.gz file hits the disk in some temp dir, as it 
doesn't know anything about tar.gz archives.  For the same reason the 
on-access scanner says nothing when the user's archive-handling
program 
opens the tar.gz file from its temp dir.  As no code has so far been 
deposited on the machine in executable form, this is not any kind of 
failure on the part of the desktop scanner.  (Yes, some lily-livered, 
weak-kneed sops may _prefer_ the "reassurance" of the malware code 
inside such files being detected "as soon as possible" but that is
not 
a strong (or even useful) criterion for judging a desktop scanner's 
quality.)

The user now sees, listed in the contents of the archive as displayed 
by their tar.gz archive handler the "card" or "picture" or "document" 
or whatever that the Email message promised, so double-clicks it.
_Now_ 
their virus scanner gets excited.  The archive handling program 
extracts the file to a temp dir and the on-access scanner (if set to 
scan on writes and/or closes) detects the malware and pops an alert 
(and blocks further access to the file or automatically quarantines/ 
deletes/etc as it is configured).  If the scanner is only set to scan 
on execute it will pop an alert (and block/quarantine/delete) a
moment 
later when the archive handler tries to have the file executed.

There is no failure here.  The desktop scanner "protected" the user,
as 
designed.

Yes, it is easy for testers to add tests such as "detects malware 
packed in .ZIP files", "detects malware packed in .RAR files",
"detects 
malware packed in .TAR.GZ files" but the results of such tests tell
you 
squat about the quality of the product.  (In fact, that's not true -- 
as it seems axiomatic that the larger and more complex a software 
project the more bugs it will have, it would seem that the more
archive 
formats a scanner can handle the buggier the scanner will be, so
maybe 
such tests do tell us something about the quality of the products -- 
the higher the score, the buggier the product will be...)



_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html


  By Date           By Thread  

Current thread:
[ Nmap | Sec Tools | Mailing Lists | Site News | About/Contact | Advertising | Privacy ]
AlienVault