mailing list archives
Re: [HV-PAPER] Anti-Phishing Tips You ShouldNotFollow
From: "Mike Nice" <niceman () att net>
Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2006 01:22:54 -0500
Tip #4 works precisely because it defeats pharming, MITM and
The Cert box is nearly impossible to spoof because you would have to
the actual bank's certificate. Any error and your browser will pop up a
warning dialog that the host name on the SSL cert doesn't match the name
the host. That's only assuming that some corrupt CA hasn't issued a
second SSL cert for the real bank host name.
You must not have visited Codefish. The spoof wrote a https: web
address in the address bar, and wrote the bottom of the browser to
look just like an SSL connection, complete with a lock. When the lock
was clicked, it popped up something that looked just like the cert
box. Very well done indeed.
I have not seen Codefish, but Tip #4 does not rely at all on the user's
visual acuity except during the initial bookmarking. It is possible that
the Codefish technique could work if the Pharming was active during the
bookmarking when checking the certificate credentials. This is possible
But later, when the bookmark points to the bank's SSL page, the browser
would still pop up an error that the certificate name does not match during
the SSL negotiation phase. All the user has to know is 'pick the bank page
from favorites, then don't accept any popup warnings'.
I'm continually amazed by the belief that the cert box is sacrosanct.
If the underlying box is compromised, all bets are off.
This is a good point - I wouldn't place any trust in your average
E-commerce site. Hopefully a bank would pay more attention to security.
The thinking is that if you as a user have secured everything at the client
end, there is less risk of a drained account. Presumably in the US, the
bank assets are insured by the government if the bank's system is
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/