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RE: Windows Software Restriction Policy Protection Bypass
From: "Roger A. Grimes" <roger () banneretcs com>
Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2006 20:02:10 -0400

This has been publically known and disclosed for many years, since XP
Pro was first released. 

-----Original Message-----
From: 3APA3A [mailto:3APA3A () SECURITY NNOV RU] 
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2006 4:05 AM
To: bugtraq () securityfocus com; full-disclosure () lists grok org uk
Subject: Windows Software Restriction Policy Protection Bypass

Dear bugtraq () securityfocus com,

  It was reported anonymously with request to post to lists.

Windows Software Restriction Policy Protection Bypass

Author:          Anonymous
Class:           Restrictions bypass
Vector:          Local
Vendor:          Microsoft
Sofware:         Windows XP SP2, Windows Server 2003 SP1
Risk level:      Low


I  don't  know,  what  is  it  -  bug  or  feature, but I can't find any
documentation on this issue.


Software  Restriction  Policies restrictions doesn't apply if user logon
via secondary logon service (Run As).


Create  new  SRP  policy  (in Local or Domain Level GPO, for User or for
Computer). Change security levels to Disallowed. Update policy and logon
as  restricted  user. Copy notepad to the desktop. Try to launch notepad
from  desktop (will fail). Right click on notepad, choose run as, select
"Following  users",  and type current user name and password. You'll see
launched notepad. CLI version (runas.exe) provides similar results.


Why ACLs are not workaround?
If user has ability to write (create files) in any folder (for example -
profile, temporary internet files, whatever) he (or she of cause)
becomes the owner of created files. And even we revoke NTFS execute
permission on any writable folder, user can change permissions on files,
because he (or she of
cause) is creator/owner for said file.

Example (user 'test' is not an administrator):

cd \noexec
copy \WINDOWS\system32\notepad.exe .
C:\noexec>cacls notepad.exe
C:\noexec\notepad.exe BUILTIN\Users:(DENY)(Special access:)

                      BUILTIN\Users:(DENY)(Special access:)

                      NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:F

Access denided.

C:\noexec>cacls.exe notepad.exe /G test:F C:\noexec>cacls notepad.exe
C:\noexec\notepad.exe WINXP01\test:F



Disable Secondary Logon service:

sc stop seclogon
sc config seclogon start= disabled


05.06 - Vulnerability discovered
08.06.06 - Vendor notification
09.06.06 - Vendor response

"Software  Restriction  Policy  and  Group  Policy  are  not meant to be
complete  security features...For full security, we recommend using ACLs
to protect the appropriate resources in your environment..."

09.06.06 - Public disclosure

        { , . }     |\
+--oQQo->{ ^ }<-----+ \
|  ZARAZA  U  3APA3A   } You know my name - look up my number (The
+-------------o66o--+ /

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