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Full Disclosure: Re: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

Re: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

From: Brian Eaton <eaton.lists_at_gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2006 10:12:31 -0400

On 9/9/06, 3APA3A <3APA3A_at_security.nnov.ru> wrote:
> The only additional attack factor this issue creates is attacker can
> get _physical_ access to console with user's credentials _any time_
> while user is logged in, while in case token can not be red (e.g. it's
> not plugged to USB) he can only access console short after user logs in
> to compromised host (while token is not changed).

For web SSO in particular, accessing the token once is nearly as good
as accessing it constantly. The token will be used for the initial
authentication, but normally a cookie will be used for session
tracking. An attacker who can sniff the token code can certainly
steal the cookie as well.

Two-factor auth cannot be said to make accessing the network from a
compromised PC "safe". That does not make two-factor auth useless.
With plain passwords, once the attacker has the password, they can
access the network at will. With two-factor auth, they can access the
network for a much more limited time span.

Regards,
Brian

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Received on Sep 09 2006

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