Full Disclosure: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

[ArkanoiD <ark () eltex net>]

nuqneH,

Well, they could have a hardware button on the token itself at least..

On Sat, Sep 09, 2006 at 01:41:55PM +0400, 3APA3A wrote:
> Dear Hadmut Danisch,
>
>  2-factor authentication is not a way to protect against malware.
>
>  SecurID  authentication  supports  single sign-on technology. As a weak
>  side  of  this  technology,  it means, if single account on any network
>  host  is  compromised,  this  account  is compromised in whole network,
>  because  any resource can be accessed from compromised host. An ability
>  to read current key from device is required to support single sign-on.
>
>  The  only  additional  attack factor this issue creates is attacker can
>  get  _physical_  access  to  console with user's credentials _any time_
>  while  user is logged in, while in case token can not be red (e.g. it's
>  not plugged to USB) he can only access console short after user logs in
>  to compromised host (while token is not changed).
>
>
> --Thursday, September 7, 2006, 10:49:52 PM, you wrote to full-disclosure () lists grok org uk:
>
>
> HD> However, if the Token Code can be read over the USB bus, this
> HD> assumption does not hold. A single attack on the PC where the token is
> HD> plugged in would compromise both the PIN (e.g. with a keylogger) and
> HD> the token itself (e.g. writing a daemon which continuously polls the
> HD> token and forwards the token in real time to a remote attacker.
>
>
>
> -- 
> ~/ZARAZA
> http://www.security.nnov.ru/
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