Full Disclosure: Re: DLL hijacking with Autorun on a USB drive

[Charles Morris <cmorris () cs odu edu>]

> > ... Don't run applications from untrusted locations ...
> You got it wrong. Only trusted applications are run. - The attacker
> prepares a WORD.DOC (and a RICHED20.DLL) file in some place. The
> victim clicks on the WORD.DOC file, using his own installed MSWord.
Aaah, well if that is the issue, it seems to me that the vulnerability here is
that the application in question (MSWord) has it's CWD set to the directory of
the file that it is opening through the explorer shell.

It should chdir() to it's own parent directory before doing anything interesting
that depends on CWD. (i.e. loading DLLs or executing "./amazingApp.sh")

It's general good programming practice to be mindful of your CWD, I know
that personally; a call to chdir() is almost always at the top of my script.

So, I take back what I said about it being a non-issue, it IS in fact
a vulnerability in the application.

Cheers,
Charles

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