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Kryn Persistent XSS and Administrative CSRF
From: Tyler Borland <tborland1 () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2010 14:01:29 -0400

Found By:    TurboBorland
Email Address:    tborland1 () gmail com
Software: Kryn <=0.6
Date Found: 06/21/2010
Date Submitted: 06/29/2010
Ethical Disclosure:  Vendor submitted - Replied with fix: "We've fix
this issues and already uploaded the new versions for kryn-core and
usermanagement." - Submission to bugtraq.
Vulnerabilities: Persistent XSS & Administrative information change for CSRF
Site: http://www.kryn.org/
Download: http://download.kryn.org/?dp=kryn-package-basic-0.6.zip

Kryn CMS has multiple vulnerabilities. This includes the ability to
immediately own the site based off of a failed login in the
administrative login.

The vulnerable code, included in:
line 96
klog('authentication', str_replace("%s", $_REQUEST['username'],
"SECURITY Login failed for '%s' to administration"));

This is the overview section of the administrative login, which is the
entry to several administrative tasks. This will permanently store the
injection in both the failed logins and the "logs", which will execute
automatically upon viewing.

The next vulnerability is a CSRF. No action in the administrative
panel has a random token, nonce, to verify an action. Through this,
the PoC shown has the ability to change admin information:

Vulnerable Code:

class usersAdminEdit extends windowEdit {

public $table = 'system_user';
public $checkUsage = true; //default on

public $primary = array('rsn');

function __construct(){
$rsn = getArgv('rsn')+0;



public $fields = array(
'username' => array(
'label' => 'Username',
'desc' => 'Also the administration login',
'type' => 'text',
'empty' => false
'email' => array(
'label' => 'Email',
'type' => 'text',
'empty' => false
'passwd' => array(
'label' => 'Password',
'desc' => 'Let it empty to change nothing',
'type' => 'password',
'startempty' => true,
'onlyIfFilled' => true,
'modifier' => 'toPasswd'
'adminLanguage' => array(
'label' => 'Admin Language',
'type' => 'select',
'sql' => 'SELECT * FROM %pfx%system_langs',
'table_key' => 'code',
'table_label' => 'title',
'customSave' => 'saveLanguage',
'customValue' => 'getLanguage',
'userBg' => array(
'label' => 'Desktop background image',
'type' => 'fileChooser',
'customSave' => 'saveUserBg',
'customValue' => 'userBgValue',
'groups' => array(
'label' => 'Groups',
'type' => 'select',
'table' => 'system_groupaccess',
//TODO geht so nicht,aber so vllt:
'relation' => 'n-n',
'n-n' => array(
'right' => 'system_groups',
'right_key' => 'rsn',
'right_label' => 'name',
'middle' => 'system_groupaccess',
'middle_keyright' => 'group_rsn',
'middle_keyleft' => 'user_rsn',
'left_key' => 'rsn'
'size' => 6,
'multiple' => 1,
'fake' => true //'group' will not be used in update

public function userBgValue($pPrimary, $pItem){
$rsn = $pPrimary['rsn'];
$user = dbTableFetch('system_user', 1, "rsn = $rsn");
$settings = unserialize($user['settings']);
return $settings['userBg'];

public function saveUserBg(){
global $user;

$cacheCode = "user_".(getArgv('rsn')+0);

$user = dbTableFetch('system_user', 1, "rsn = ".(getArgv('rsn')+0));
$settings = unserialize( $user['settings'] );
$settings['userBg'] = getArgv('userBg', 1);
$settings = serialize( $settings );

dbUpdate( 'system_user', array('rsn' => getArgv('rsn')+0),
array('settings' => $settings) );

public function saveLanguage(){

$user = dbTableFetch('system_user', 1, "rsn = ".(getArgv('rsn')+0));
$settings = unserialize( $user['settings'] );
$settings['adminLanguage'] = getArgv('adminLanguage');
$settings = serialize( $settings );

dbUpdate( 'system_user', array('rsn' => getArgv('rsn')+0),
array('settings' => $settings) );

public function getLanguage( $pPrimary, $pItem ){
$rsn = $pPrimary['rsn'];
$user = dbTableFetch('system_user', 1, "rsn = $rsn");
$settings = unserialize($user['settings']);
return $settings['adminLanguage'];

public function toPasswd( $pPw ){
return md5($pPw);


No nonce checking for any field in submission. POST used, but not required.

+++Vulnerability Impact:    Through this, our injection will modify
whatever we feel like for whatever user:

No bounds checking (even if added, we can point a script src= to a
script and still inject), will inject this CSRF into the page as
persistant XSS, and once admin logs in and looks at overview,
immediate (can be made quieter) control can be had.
Virtual file manager already included, so no need for shell.  ;)

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