Full Disclosure: Re: Impossible to Maintain Secure Session With Twitter.com Web Interface

[Sam Quigley <quigley () emerose com>]

> iSEC Partners Security Advisory - 2010-001-twitter https://www.isecpartners.com
[…]
> 2010-04-26: Twitter asserts that it is now possible to maintain an HTTPS
>             session if the session begins with HTTPS; i.e. users can
>             navigate to https://twitter.com to start an HTTPS session.
>             However, https://twitter.com/ contains HTTP resources, including
>             a JSON response from http://twitter.com. An active network
>             attacker could potentially use this weakness to insert their
>             own code into the page and maintain control over the user's
>             session.
Also worth noting that, until yesterday, all SSL pages (including sensitive ones like /oauth/authorize) loaded 
Javascript from maps.google.com without using SSL.  Like the issue iSEC identified above, this has now been fixed.

Also yesterday, they (finally) disabled unsafe SSL renegotiation, thus blocking the credential-stealing attack 
identified by Anil Kurmus last November.[1]

So: progress.  Unfortunately, they still support SSLv2 and a variety of weak ciphers[2] — so there's still room for 
improvement.

-sq


[1]: http://www.securegoose.org/2009/11/tls-renegotiation-vulnerability-cve.html
[2]: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssldb/analyze.html?d=twitter.com&s=168.143.162.36
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