Full Disclosure: Re: Windows Vista/7 lpksetup dll hijack

["Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor () hammerofgod com>]

> Am Montag, den 25.10.2010, 22:56 +0000 schrieb Thor (Hammer of God):
> > The main point is that you've got to get people to not only connect up
> > to your remote share, but you've got to get them to execute the file,
> > etc.  So I'm just wondering what makes this anything more than any
> > other "put a malicious link here to make the user execute it" or email
> > attachment business, particularly when you say "Remote Code
> > Execution."
> Err... as far as I know, the interesting part is having the current path be set to
> something you can control (to make windows load evil dlls), and if you just link
> to the file, that's not the case.
But your *aren't* controlling it.  The loadlibrary seek priority is a set path.  The user must first connect to the 
share, and launch the file from the share.  THAT makes it part of the working directory.  These are not the droids you 
are looking for. 

This particular execution mechanism still makes lpksetup run and it still launches UAC.  Now what IS interesting is 
that, as I've previously stated, when one cancels UAC, the oci.dll is still executed - however it can only run code 
that the user can.

Thus, if you are going to get a user to connect to a share and launch a file from that share, why make it go through 
all that crap (and launch UAC) when you can just have them run an EXE that does whatever you want in user mode without 
worrying about UAC at all.  That's my main point.

t

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