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[CORE-2010-1001] Cisco WebEx .atp and .wrf Overflow Vulnerabilities
From: CORE Security Technologies Advisories <advisories () coresecurity com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 18:17:59 -0300

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    Core Security Technologies - Corelabs Advisory
         http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/

    Cisco WebEx .atp and .wrf Overflow Vulnerabilities



1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Cisco WebEx .atp and .wrf Overflow Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2010-1001
Advisory URL:
[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/webex-atp-and-wrf-overflow-vulnerabilities]
Date published: 2011-01-31
Date of last update: 2011-01-31
Vendors contacted: Cisco
Release mode: Coordinated release



2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Stack-based Buffer Overflow [CWE-121], Stack-based Buffer
Overflow [CWE-121]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes (client-side)
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2010-3269, CVE-2010-3270
Bugtraq ID: N/A



3. *Vulnerability Description*

There are stack overflows on WebEx [1] that can be exploited by sending
maliciously crafted .atp and .wrf files to a vulnerable WebEx user. When
opened, these files trigger a reliably exploitable stack based buffer
overflow. Code execution is trivially achieved on the .wrf case because
WebEx Player allocates a function pointer on the stack that is
periodically used in what seems to be a callback mechanism, and also
because DEP and ASLR are not enabled. In the .atp case an exception
handler can be overwritten on the stack, and most registers can be
trivially overwritten.


4. *Vulnerable packages*

   . Contact Cisco for a list of vulnerable versions.


5. *Non-vulnerable packages*

   . Contact Cisco.


6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

All clients of WebEx Meeting Center should now be running a patched
version according to Cisco. A non-vulnerable version of WebEx Player
should be available at [http://www.webex.com/downloadplayer.html].


7. *Credits*

These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Federico Muttis,
Sebastian Tello and Manuel Muradas from Core Security Technologies
during Bugweek 2010 as part of the "Cisco Baby Cisco!" team [2]. The
publication of this advisory was coordinated by Pedro Varangot.


8. *Technical Description*


8.1. *WebEx Player .wrf Buffer Overflow [CVE-2010-3269]*

WebEx Player can be used to playback recordings of WebEx sessions. These
recordings can be stored using the .wrf closed and undocumented file
format. By fuzzing this file format a crash due to a stack overflow was
discovered. A function pointer can be overwritten in the stack resulting
in reliable code execution because of the fact that DEP and ASLR are
disabled. This vulnerability can also be exploited by publishing a .wrf
video file in a meeting, resulting in the compromise of the meeting's
participants.

/-----
.text:6070C272 loc_6070C272:                           ; CODE XREF:
sub_6070C050+255j
.text:6070C272                 test    esi, esi
.text:6070C274                 jnz     short loc_6070C28F
.text:6070C276                 push    ebx
.text:6070C277                 call    dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]   ; call to
function pointer on the stack
.text:6070C27A                 add     esp, 4
.text:6070C27D                 test    al, al
.text:6070C27F                 jz      loc_6070C374
.text:6070C285                 mov     edi, [ebp+0]
.text:6070C288                 mov     esi, [ebp+4]
.text:6070C28B                 mov     eax, [esp+0D98h+var_D80]
.text:6070C28F
.text:6070C28F loc_6070C28F:                           ; CODE XREF:
sub_6070C050+224j
.text:6070C28F                 mov     cl, [edi]   ; cl can be
controlled, it is read from the malicious .wrf file
.text:6070C291                 dec     esi
.text:6070C292                 mov     [esp+eax+0D98h+var_C8C], cl   ;
this mov overflows the stack with user controlled values
.text:6070C299                 mov     ecx, [esp+0D98h+var_D84]
.text:6070C29D                 inc     edi
.text:6070C29E                 inc     eax
.text:6070C29F                 cmp     eax, ecx
.text:6070C2A1                 mov     [esp+0D98h+var_D80], eax
.text:6070C2A5                 jl      short loc_6070C272

- -----/



8.2. *WebEx Meeting Center .atp Buffer Overflow [CVE-2010-3270]*

WebEx Meeting Center allows polls to be conducted between all
participants of a WebEx session. By serving a specially crafted .atp
file (used for conducting polls) the meeting host can then abruptly
disconnect from the server, and when another client becomes host and
tries to share the .atp file with the other clients arbitrary code
execution is possible on his workstation. If his connection to the
server is then severed by a malicious payload, the .atp file will be
cycled to the next connected client. Reliable code execution is possible
because a big chunk of the stack is overwritten (including the SEH),
ASLR and DEP are disabled, and SafeSEH seems to be also disabled. We
developed trivial examples that take control of EIP using arbitrary
characters.


9. *Report Timeline*

. 2010-10-04:
Core Security Technologies contacts Cisco PSIRT using their provided PGP
key notifying them of the vulnerabilities and sending an advisory draft,
a proof of concept for the WebEx Player vulnerability, and a proof of
concept for the Meeting Center vulnerability including details of how to
reproduce both vulnerabilities, and details about the behaviour of the
PoC for the Player vulnerability on Windows XP SP2 (which overwrites EIP
with 0x41414141 on that platform). October 18th 2010 (a two weeks
timeframe) is set as a potential release date for the advisory.

. 2010-10-05:
Cisco PSIRT contacts Core stating that their development team is out of
the office till Friday October 8th. November 15th 2010 is mentioned as
an estimated release date for a fix.

. 2010-10-05:
Core replies to Cisco PSIRT postponing the release date of this advisory
for one week, to Monday October 25th, in order to contemplate the fact
that Cisco's development team is away from office for the week. Further
changes to the release date will be made after receiving technical
feedback. November the 15th is mentioned to be a possible date to settle
on.

. 2010-10-11:
Cisco PSIRT replies acknowledging "an exception in WebEx player" but
that doesn't overwrite EIP as Core Security Technologies indicated.
Cisco notifies that they were not able to reproduce the crash in WebEx
Meeting Center. Cisco PSIRT also asks for more detailed information
about the version of WebEx Player used.

. 2010-10-12:
Core sends the requested information, also attaching new proof of
concept exploits for the WebEx Player vulnerability (that now executes
code and launches "calc.exe"), and further details about the steps
needed to reproduce the WebEx Meeting Center crash. Details about the
system where the proof of concept for the WebEx Player vulnerability was
run are asked. Details about the "exception" are also asked, specially
noting that if other registers are overwritten this should be considered
as a vulnerability that would possibly lead to reliable code execution
even if EIP was not modified (as noted by Core on the e-mail where the
PoC was attached). No reply is received to this e-mail.

. 2010-10-19:
Core resends the previous e-mail asking for news about reproduction of
the vulnerability on Cisco's side and asking if there was any problem in
the reception or interpretation of the last communication. No reply is
received to this e-mail.

. 2010-10-28:
Core Security Technologies resends the last e-mail, unilaterally
rescheduling the publication of this advisory to November 8th 2010,
which is closer to Cisco's initial estimation for the release of a fix.
Core states its willingness to reschedule this publication date but only
under firm commitment from Cisco to working seriously towards fixing
this issue in a scheduled timeframe. An updated advisory draft is
attached which includes an updated timeline.

. 2010-10-30:
Cisco PSIRT replies acknowledging the vulnerability, stating that they
were able to reproduce code execution results in the currently released
version of WebEx, and a crash in their current development version.
Cisco also states that there is not information yet from their
development team about when a fix for this vulnerability will be released.

. 2010-11-09:
Core replies offering more technical details about exploitation if they
are needed, and reminding Cisco that the crash in their development
version may also be exploitable even if the current proof of concept
exploit only crashes it. The publication date for this advisory is
rescheduled to November 22nd 2010. Core states that they will like to
schedule a firm date for the release of information about this
vulnerability to the public and hence would like to get more information
from Cisco about the schedule for the release of a fix.

. 2010-11-15:
Cisco states that fixed code will be deployed in mid-December, but since
WebEx Meeting Center runs on a SaaS environment it takes about four or
five weeks for all clients to be running the latest version of the code.

. 2010-12-06:
Cisco contacts Core since no reply was received in the past two weeks,
and clarifies that a fix will be deployed on December 15th and should be
done on January 11th 2011.

. 2010-12-06:
Core states that they believe this advisory should be released as soon
as the fix is deployed, since diffing the WebEx binary on the client
side gives full details about the WebEx Meeting Center vulnerability to
an average skilled reverse engineer. Core schedules the publication of
this advisory to December 15th 2010.

. 2010-12-07:
Cisco contacts Core stating that releasing details about this
vulnerability would endanger customers, since there is no action they
can take to protect themselves because the responsibility of upgrading
the code ran by the customer falls on Cisco. Cisco mentions that "many
of these customers are probably shared between Cisco and Core Security".

. 2010-12-10:
Cisco contacts Core stating that they have just discovered the WebEx
Meeting Center Vulnerability affects a new set of customers that where
not accounted for originally. These are customers running T27SP21 that
can not be upgraded to SP22. An emergency patch will be released for
SP21 in January 2011, and this sets back the date when all clients
should be running an updated version to the "end of January, beginning
of February."

. 2010-12-14:
Core proposes to split this advisory into two different advisories to
better accommodate the WebEx Meeting Center SaaS release cycle. On one
advisory, the .wrf client side vulnerability would be described, and the
other would be dedicated to the WebEx Meeting Center vulnerability that
may compromise a meeting's host computer. Core believes this mitigates
the risk in a more effective way, since clients can update WebEx Player
by themselves on December 15th (the date when Cisco stated the fixed
version would be released) and no details of the Meeting Center
vulnerability would be released until all clients are running an updated
version.

. 2010-12-15:
Cisco states they wouldn't like the advisory to be splitted, and that
they prefer Core Security Technologies to go ahead and release
information about both vulnerabilities.

. 2010-12-15:
Core states that they prefer to release two advisories because these are
two different bugs, in two pieces of software, each one of them with a
differently working update channel determined by the vendor. Core also
informs Cisco that the download link for WebEx Player points to a
vulnerable version as of today, and asks Cisco to clarify what date they
meant as mid-December, since Core would like to know when a fixed
version of WebEx Player will be available for download to be able to
publish the WebEx Player vulnerability.

. 2010-12-16:
Cisco replies saying that releasing two advisories seems like a good
plan to them. Cisco also states that since many of their customers
observe a lockdown policy during the holidays season, they take a "don't
upgrade" policy of their own until Monday January 10th, 2011. That is
the reason why the download link of WebEx Player has not been changed yet.

. 2011-01-10:
Core states that they are ready to release this advisory on January
11th, and that releasing two separate advisories seems pointless now
because the release date of both would be very similar, and the original
idea was to mitigate the risk posed by the .wrf vulnerability. Core also
states that they are reviewing the best course of action to take with
the issue regarding clients running the old version of WebEx (T27SP21)
that according to Cisco are unable to upgrade to SP22 since this was not
accounted for previously.

. 2011-01-13:
Core states that since they have committed previously to release the
advisory taking into account Cisco's consideration about their SaaS
patch deploy model, when factoring the issue of clients running the SP21
version of Meeting Center scheduled by Cisco for emergency update on
January, a release date of January the 31st seems reasonable. This date
should be taken as final and Core Security Technologies believes it
takes into account all information given by Cisco about SaaS updating
timeframes. If this is not the case Cisco is asked to rectify ASAP.

. 2011-01-14:
Cisco confirms that the timeframe (publishing both vulnerabilities on
January 31st) works for them.

. 2011-01-31:
The advisory CORE-2010-1001 is published.



10. *References*

[1] [http://www.webex.com/]
[2]
[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/index.php?module=Wiki&action=view&type=project&name=Bugweek]


11. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com].


12. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help
security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a
proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship
product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing
enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,
endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are
exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security
investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security
Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class
security consulting services, including penetration testing and software
security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core
Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at
[http://www.coresecurity.com].


13. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2011 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2011 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)
License: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/]


14. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].

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