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Re: VNC viewers: Clipboard of host automatically sent to remote machine
From: Dan Kaminsky <dan () doxpara com>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:09:32 -0500

Those who try to manage potentially malicious servers do so over IP KVM, in
which the foreign server basically gets only inbound Keyboard and Mouse and
outbound uncompressed pixels.

Anything more is untrusted, for a reason.

On Tue, Jan 24, 2012 at 5:50 PM, Nick FitzGerald
<nick () virus-l demon co uk>wrote:

Ben Bucksch wrote:

Even then, that is not sufficient, as explained in length.

No -- what you "explained in length" _and_ seem impervious to
understanding, despite a couple of respondents explaining it quite
clearly, is that you have chosen to perform ongoing "sensitive" work in
an environment where doing so is, at best, represents a highly
questionable security stance.

_Part_ of what contributes to that questionability is your choice to
more-or-less continuously run an application that you should always
have known leaks access to the clipboard of what you oddly choose to
describe as a "trusted desktop" (odd, because you should know that
exposing the host clipboard to the client is common -- in fact,
probably the standard default -- functionality of VNC clients).

That your chosen/preferred/whatever VNC client does not allow you to
turn off, or otherwise modify or monitor this functionality is not a
security vulnerability or bug, as you seem intent on portraying it.  It
may be an undesirable feature (or, more accurately, lack of a feature)
but don't you have other VNC clients to choose from?  Must you use this
particular VNC client?  If so and this method of working is so critical
to you, should you not choose a different platform for your "trusted
desktop" and run a more suitably configurable VNC client?  Or, if your
sensitive work is really that sensitive, should you not invest in a
second machine for remotely monitoring/interacting with the the
untrusted, sandboxed applications you need to run, so that they really
are securely separated (can we all say "air gap"?) from your more
"sensitive" operations?  It would not have to be a very heavy-duty
machine -- a very low-end netbook style machine, or possibly even a
cheap tablet-style device may more than suffice...

...

Another part of that questionability is obvious to anyone with nous
reading this list...



Regards,

Nick FitzGerald


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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

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