Full Disclosure: Re: [Full-disclosure] ZPanel arbitrary code execution + roo t escalation vulnerability

["Dex" <0x41 () hush ai>]

Hi

I wrote about this back in November due to a number of reasons.

http://securitytheatre.net/2012/11/06/zpanel-6-1-1-remote-
authenticated-remote-root/



On Wed, 17 Apr 2013 10:37:43 +0100 "Sven Slootweg" 
<admin () cryto net> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> There's an arbitrary (PHP) code execution in ZPanel, a free and
> open-source shared hosting control panel. Using the included zsudo
> binary, access can be escalated and commands can be run as root.
>
> The vulnerability: ZPanel uses a poor "templater" system that
> basically consists of a few str_replace calls and an eval... and 
> as
> could be expected from something like this, it does a very poor 
> job at
> preventing malicious code. The relevant code can be seen here:
> https://github.com/bobsta63/zpanelx/blob/master/dryden/ui/templatep
> arser.class.php
> (note the poor attempt at stripping out <?php and ?> tags).
>
> By effectively injecting the replacement that occurs in line 71, 
> one
> can run arbitrary PHP code. When combined with ZPanels `zsudo` 
> binary,
> one can execute arbitrary commands as root, with a maximum of 5
> additional arguments (aside from the path to the
> to-be-executed-command).
>
> The scope: Custom templates/themes can be uploaded by resellers 
> and
> administrators. This effectively means that anyone that can get 
> access
> to a reseller account through any means, including by purchasing a
> reseller service from a ZPanel-using host, can gain root access,
> without detection.
>
> PoC: Insert the following code anywhere in master.ztml or any 
> other
> template that is parsed by the template parser, replacing `touch 
> derp`
> with any command of choice:
>
> <& bogus']; exec("/etc/zpanel/panel/bin/zsudo touch /root/derp"); 
> echo
> $value['bogus &>
>
> Strangely, login.ztml does not appear to use the templater, and 
> seems
> to allow PHP execution by simply using <?php and ?> tags (which I
> would consider a vulnerability in itself, but that aside).
>
> Vendor notification: I have warned the ZPanel development team 
> about
> their insecure templater *months* ago, and explicitly pointed out 
> that
> their "PHP code filtering" was not going to work well. I have
> submitted a patch for some other fixable aspects of the templater
> (which was merged into the main repository), but the development 
> team
> insisted that the security in the templater was fine, and that it
> wasn't a problem, basically telling me that they were not going to
> change it. They have not fixed this vulnerability, nor do they 
> appear
> to have any interest in doing so in the near future.
>
> How to solve it: Either remove the reseller template uploading
> functionality (this would impair core functionality), or use a 
> real
> templating engine that does not use a few str_replace() calls 
> strung
> together in front of an eval().
>
> I'm quite new to this list, and not exactly a pentesting expert, 
> so if
> I left out some important information in the above message, please 
> do
> let me know.
>
> - Sven Slootweg
>
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_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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