On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:45 PM, <Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu> wrote:
On Thu, 12 Sep 2013 18:23:53 -0400, Jeffrey Walton said:
They ignored my comments on fixed size arrays based on MAX_PATH and
the subsequent overflows and silent truncations due to use of sprintf
Which "they" was it?
If you're referring to this:
There were many more than just that one.
Note that the guy you were replying to was a Japanese software engineer
employed by NEC. If you want to argue the guy was an NSA plant trying to get a
backdoor in, feel free. But don't expect to be taken seriously without some
The code was accepted into the project
And it counted as "underhanded", how, exactly?
I did not claim that.
In other words - under what conditions can you make a truncation to MAX_PATH
cause an actual hole? And to count as "underhanded" rather than merely "buggy",
you'd need at least a whiff of evidence that it was intentional.
What's the difference if its exploitable in practice?
There's no need to consciously add backdoors when developers are
checking in shit code. They serve the same purpose add add a level of
Or as Kohei replied to you:
"The selinux_mnt is not a variable given by external one, unless
application does not update it by itself.
It is not difficult to modify this part to return ENAMETOOLONG
when snprintf() returns larger or equal with PATH_MAX."
In the Linux community, this would count as '-ENOPATCH', as I'm not
finding where you ever submitted a patch to fix the issue.
The more eyes the better, right....
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